Senator Obama is on a vist to the Middle East and Europe.   Senator McCain went to visit Colombia earlier in July.   These trips suggest a seriousness of purpose that American presidential candidates often lack.    They offer us hope that the candidates want to learn how to do the job well.   Furthermore, they offer a hyper-attentive world grounds for hope that the next president will have a higher level of interest in other countries than did his predecessor.

So far as I know, it is unprecedented for the two party candidates to do foreign policy trips before the election.    I can think of three reasons why we are seeing this now.    First, because the primary elections started early this year, there is a hiatus between the end of the primaries and the party conventions.   Thus the candidates can spare the time to go abroad.   Second, foreign policy has risen much higher on the agenda of concerns of typical American voters, since September 11, 2001, and since the invasion of Iraq.   (And of course Obama wants to put to rest McCain’s past jibes about not having visited Afghanistan and Iraq.)   Third, Barack Obama and John McCain are not the usual inward-looking, domestically-oriented parochial governors that we all too often get as presidential candidates.    Both are US Senators, and both in their youths had very formative adventures in foreign countries (both in Southeast Asia, as it happens).    Thus both, if nothing else, have the cosmopolitan outlook that a world leader needs.

Traditionally new presidential candidates do not think much about foreign policy during their campaigns.  This is especially true of governors who have only domestic experience.   But, regardless of the candidates, in most election years the American public cares little for international affairs, and is far more concerned about domestic issues.

Once new presidents take office they ften have to go through a period of “breaking in” in the area of foreign policy.   International events often take them by surprise and disrupt all their fine platforms and plans.  This period can be very costly to the country.   Think of John Kennedy’s first-year failures in his initial summit meeting with Premier Khrushchev and in the Bay of Pigs invasion.   Think of George W. Bush’s first-year failures in ignoring warnings that Al Qaeda would strike in the US or that an invasion of Iraq would be fraught with danger.    A little international exposure before they took office would have served them well.  So perhaps the excessive length of this election cycle has a silver lining after all !

[Any readers who may wish to post comments: Please go to RGE website, if you have access.]

 
President Bush yesterday eliminated a 27-year executive moratorium on off-shore oil drilling (NYT, 7/15/2008, p.A13), a move also supported by presidential candidate John McCain. 

The Democrats responded:

(1) that this was an election-year stunt,

(2) that the move would be too small to make a difference

(3) that it would bring no downward pressure on oil prices at the crucial short-term horizon, and

(4) that it would not ultimately help move the country in the direction of energy security. 

The Democrats have the right answer, but are perhaps giving the wrong reasons.

 No doubt they are right that it is a political stunt.  A Congressional ban on offshore drilling has been in effect since 1981, so the President’s action is moot.  But making a political point in this way is in itself fair game.  The Republicans are trying to blame high oil prices on the Democrats.   Similarly, the Democrats’ response could well be the right one from the viewpoint of political gamesmanship.

But I should try to stick to economics in my blog, rather than politics.  The issues can be slippery; but let’s take the bit in our teeth and drill down on what would make for good for policy.

On grounds of good economic policy the Democrats’ chosen arguments seem to me beside the point.  It is true that the oil in the offshore sites would not be enough to have much effect on the world price.  It does not amount to much as a percentage of world reserves, which is the relevant metric for determining the effect on price.   “The Department of Energy estimates that there are eighteen billion barrels of technically recoverable oil in offshore areas of the continentail United States that are now closed to drilling…[A]t current rates of consumption, eighteen billion barrels would satisfy less than seven months of global demand.” (The New Yorker, Aug. 18, 2008, p. 28.)  But if one believed there were no cost to more domestic oil drilling, then one should conclude that every little bit helps.  Basic economic theory tells us to judge proposals by the ratio of benefits to costs, not by the absolute magnitude of the benefits.

Regarding point (3), both parties are responding (unsurprisingly) to the American public’s great sensitivity to short-term prices for gasoline (in the summer) and home heating oil (in the winter).  No doubt high prices are causing a lot of hardship.   (And even if it takes ten years to develop new oil reserves, the knowledge that the oil was coming should put a bit of downward pressure on prices today.)   But market prices are high today for a reason.   What is the market failure that would call for government intervention in the oil market?

The most obvious market failures are the externalities that characterize air pollution and emission of greenhouse gases.  The ban on off-shore drilling was originally enacted in response to damaging coastal oil spills;  in the years since then we have also learned that the atmospheric damage from oil consumption is far greater than we had realized.  The environmental externalities of course are reasons for higher prices, not lower.   I am struck every time I see an article on politicians’ commitment to action on global climate change sitting side-by-side in the newspaper with an article on their opposition to oil price increases.   

I realize that higher energy taxes are politically out of the question at this point.   But I could imagine legislation that would automatically raise energy taxes if and when oil prices fall, thereby putting a floor at recent levels and providing industry with the clear incentive to undertake the long-term investment in energy-saving equipment and technology that we badly need.  Rebate the proceeds by fixing the AMT, or removing the payroll tax on low-income Americans, one answer to the income distribution point.  In any case McCain’s proposal for a gas tax holiday is a spectacularly bad idea.

The other obvious market failure that might justify government intervention in the market is national security, and here we come to argument number (4), and the central point of my post.  While Americans need to recognize that achieving complete energy security is an impossible goal, it should indeed by a national objective to reduce our dependence on imported oil.  We could thereby reduce our need to fight messy wars in the Mideast and to coddle unpalatable autocrats worldwide.  But, in the first place, conservation — not new drilling – is the largest and most sustainable component of such a strategy.   In the second place, as high as world energy prices are now by historical standards, this is not the worst-case geopolitical crisis that we should be seeking to protect our economy against.  That worst-case scenario is a prolonged loss of world access to Gulf oil stemming from some combination of military conflict with Iran, anti-Western popular uprisings in the region, terrorism, and/or nuclear or radiological weapons. 

Thus the Democrats have it precisely backwards. The problem with Republican proposals to re-open domestic oil drilling is not that we desperately need the oil right now, whereas new oil discoveries would not come on line for 10 years or more. Rather it is that we might truly desperately need the oil in 20 or 30 years, and so don’t want to use it up over the next decade.

Economists frequently complain that even when 98% of the profession agrees on something (say a free-trade proposition), the media will go to lengths to dig up an economist from the 2% minority in order to balance one from the 98% majority, in their feverish and misguided attempt to appear unbiased and balanced on every issue, even issues that don’t really have two sides. The New York Times op-ed page has outdone itself today by publishing “The 18-cent Solution” by Bryan Caplan. The “callout” heading is “Found: an economist who backs the summer gas-tax holiday.” The impetus, of course, was the question posed to Hillary Clinton by a reporter: can you name a single economist who supports the idea of a summer suspension of the federal gasoline tax?     Newshour gave up on trying to find one.

In this case, the NYT evidently couldn’t find an economist who really takes the minority position on economic grounds, or even on reasonable political economy grounds. (The profession is all-but-unanimous on keeping the gas tax, as Greg Mankiw notes. And for good reasons.) Rather Caplan’s argument is a convoluted political rationalization: (1) the high gas prices engender populist anger that might lead to bad policies, (2) yes, a gas tax holiday is a bad policy, but (3) one can make a political argument for the gas tax holiday because it is not as bad as some of the other “populist nonsense: price controls, rationing, windfall profits taxes…” that we might get instead. This political argument is a bit of a stretch as it is, but he then goes on to make it absurd by supporting “a pairing of an excess profits tax with a gas tax holiday” on the grounds that it is not as bad as “an excess profits tax all by itself.” Apparently two bad policies are better than none.

This sort of reasoning makes me sympathize with political scientists who tell economists to leave the politics to them. A more straightforward political argument would have been “Hillary is the best candidate and so one can justify anything that will get her nominated.” Or the symmetric argument for John McCain, who originally proposed the gas tax holiday in April. But the New York Times editors, sensibly, would not have chosen to print such op-eds, out of the hundreds that are submitted every week. So they printed instead an economist’s political argument too complicated for them to understand. If they are going to do this, they might as well print economists’ economic arguments too complicated for them to understand, which they are seldom willing to do.

Bryan Caplan is a perfectly competent economist, with a Ph.D., a job and an interesting book and everything. (He may be a bit too desperate for publicity. But those of us who live in glass weblogs can’t throw stones.) Why would he spout the nonsense that is in this op-ed? The answer is very clear: it is the way to get into the New York Times. He gleefully admits as much on his blog today: “I’ve finally made the Gray Lady: Today’s New York Times features my op-ed inspired by Sunday’s post, I’ll Shill for Hillary. I hope critics don’t misrepresent me as an economic apostate; I’m not dissenting from the standard analysis… look on the bright side: I’m in the New York Times. Sweet!”

Bryan: A suggestion. You should now write a letter to the New York Times retracting your op-ed on the grounds that you should have known that readers would incorrectly infer that you were supporting the policy on economic grounds. [Arnold, can you help out here?] If you do this, the Club of Economists might let you back in. Plus, you will have gotten your name in the NYT a second time! “Sweet!”

So Arthur Laffer — still arguing the improbable “supply side” proposition that cutting income tax rates generally raises total tax revenue — is apparently now a special adviser to John McCain. And McCain has taken on a big consignment of the snake oil, to Greg Mankiw’s dismay. The political temptation for a Republican candidate to promise both lower tax rates and higher revenues is irresistible. The policy-makers who cut taxes when Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush, respectively, came to power subscribed to this claim. Remarkably, at the same time, the economists who were the chief economic advisers to Reagan and Bush during these tax cuts disavow the proposition that they increase revenue (Murray Weidenbaum, Martin Feldstein, Glenn Hubbard, Mankiw…) . Almost all serious economists – let us say Ph.D. economists – disagree with this proposition, with only a microscopic handful of exceptions like Laffer. Indeed some of the advisers who defend the Reagan and Bush economic policies claim that this formulation of supply side economics is a caricature, and was not the true rationale of the tax cuts. This wishful thinking is directly at odds with quotes from the presidents themselves and their Treasury secretaries and other economic officials, to the effect that tax cuts stimulate income so much as to produce more tax revenue. Laffer is not a straw man. (See my next post.)

Even more interesting, the academic defenders of the Republican tax cuts often offer a proposition that is diametrically opposed to the defense offered by their political masters. This is the famous “starve the beast” hypothesis: the claim that if you deprive the government of tax revenue, it will reduce government spending, which is of course viewed as a worthy objective. If this proposition were true, and the supply side hypothesis were also true, it would lead to the nonsensical proposition that Republican presidents should raise tax rates in order to reduce tax revenue (Laffer) and thereby reduce government spending (Starve the Beast). I challenge some candidate to run on that platform !

As it happens, there is abundant empirical evidence against both the Lafferite hypothesis and the Starve the Beast hypothesis. In other words, just because two propositions are diametrically opposed doesn’t mean they are not both wrong. I hope that in this election campaign, the media do something they have failed to do in the past. If McCain proposes extending the Bush tax cuts, he should at least be forced to choose between the Lafferite defense, which tends to be driven more by political expediency, and the “Starve the Beast” defense, which has more support among at least some reputable Republican economists. Only then can the rest of us know which of the two propositions to refute.