Every pundit agrees that President Obama did badly in the first debate.  But I can’t help wondering whether he (and VP Joe Biden) would have been able to come out swinging as freely as they have in the subsequent debates, if it were not for what happened in Denver.  Obama must have been afraid of sounding unpresidential.   But because his initial performance was so roundly criticized for passivity, he was licensed after that to argue aggressively:  “What you are saying is not true, Governor Romney.”  And it helps that he was right, each time.   (My morning-after talking-head comments can be viewed: “Re-cap of 1st Presidential Debate,” Oct.4; and “Re-cap” of 2nd Presidential Debate, Oct.17.)

Of all the areas where Romney’s assertions in the first debate were rebutted successfully in each of the subsequent debates, his tax “plan” is one of the most important.  The credibility of independent analysts and fact-checkers has helped here.   The main problem is not that Romney hasn’t announced a plan detailed enough to be worthy of the name.   The main problem is, rather, that no plan can achieve three simultaneous goals, each of which the Republican candidate has repeatedly promised:   (1) cutting tax rates 20%,  (2) avoiding loss of tax revenue by elimination of deductions, and yet  (3) preventing overall taxes from going up on those earning less than $200,000 a year.    Romney and Ryan have been conducting a shell game:  they show the public what is under two of the three shells, but not all three at any one time.  For example, Republicans will argue that the tax cut won’t raise the budget deficit by citing a study that cuts middle class benefits like the tax-deductibility of mortgage interest.  Then when reminded that they promised not to do that, they will cite a study that lets taxes go up on those earning $100,000-$200,000.

The 20% cut in tax rates would in itself cost $480 billion on revenue in 2015 or about $5 trillion over the next 10 years.  I don’t think there is disagreement about that.  (But Bruce Bartlett estimates $6 trillion:Tax Notes, 10/29/12, p.2.)   All the disagreement is whether Romney can make up the revenue by eliminating deductions as he claims.  Yet in the first debate, when Obama started to address this question, Romney tried to shut him down by saying that a $5 trillion tax cut wasn’t his complete plan, as if anyone had ever said it was.  Worse, in the Vice Presidential debate, Congressman Ryan claimed that the Obama deputy campaign manager had “stipulated” that they had been wrong, that the tax cut wasn’t really $5 trillion.  The media was fooled by this one, failing to note that she had only made the (accurate) statement that the question of controversy was not whether the overall loss of revenue would be the full $5 trillion, but whether Romney could make all of that up by eliminating deductions.  This is an elementary point and Obama was able to get it across effectively in the second and third debates, even to number-weary viewers.

Some pundits say that, if Romney’s weakness is that his budget numbers don’t add up, Obama’s weakness is that he hasn’t laid out a specific agenda for his second term.  (Either that, or that he didn’t get us out of the recession fast enough.)

What will happen after the election?   It is typical that fervently debated plans of the candidates become mostly irrelevant soon after the winner’s presidential term begins.  (My Oct.22 talking head comments on this are viewable, at the 26-min. mark.) They are overtaken by unexpected events, such as a market crash at home or an armed attack somewhere in the world.  In the present case, we have a good idea of the events that, soon after the election, will quickly replace the sound-bites of the campaign.   In economic policy, a renewed euro crisis within the next year is likely to have serious spillover effects.   But more urgent for the American president will be the Fiscal Cliff, which arrives January 2013.   Immediately after the election it will become the dominant question.  Yet neither candidate is talking about it.  The explanation for this silence is in part that no politician wants to talk about the specifics of budget-cutting pain; but it is also in part that the two candidates genuinely can’t know what they will do before they know how many supporters they would have in Congress to do it. By the way, I have a prediction regarding monetary policy.   If Romney were to be elected president, his position that monetary policy has been much too easy would turn around on a dime.   Like Nixon, Reagan and Bush before him, he would seek to push the Fed toward easing, not tightening.

Foreign policy was the focus of the third debate.  (Incidentally, why does Romney believe that Syria “is Iran’s path to the sea?”  That is a strange rendering of geography.  Four years ago, McCain thought that Afghanistan bordered Iraq.  GWB said that Africa was one nation.  Reagan mixed up Brazil and Bolivia. Anyone see a pattern? )

The pressing foreign policy issues for the next president will likely be the withdrawal from Afghanistan, the nuclear standoff with Iran, and territorial disputes over islands off the coast of Asia.  Instead of discussing realistically the sort of policy decisions that will need to be made, the candidates have been debating “who said what, when” after the killing of four American diplomats in Benghazi last month.   Despite that tragedy, Obama’s overall policy in Libya remains a success on net.  His actions helped remove Qaddafi, which is reminiscent to me of Bill Clinton’s interventions in Kosovo (helping remove Milosevic) and Haiti (Cédras).   Removing bad guys without US combat deaths.   Libya ranks behind two other major Obama foreign policy successes: withdrawal from Iraq and removal of bin Laden.   Contrast that to the 4,000 Americans who died in the Iraq war; the 3,000 in the World Trade Center; and the global damage done to American foreign policy more generally during those years.

         A survey of economists is published in the November 2012 issue of Foreign Policy.  One question was whether we thought that the US unemployment rate would dip below 8.0% before the election.   When the FP conducted the poll at the end of the summer, unemployment was 8.1-8.2%.  Now it’s 7.8%.  Only 8% of the respondents said “yes.”   (I was one.  I basically just extrapolated the trend of the last two years.)   

My fellow economists choose defense spending and agricultural subsidies as the two categories of US federal budget that they think the best to cut.  They rate the euro crisis as the greatest threat to the world economy now and are particularly worried about Spain.   

For a slideshow presentation of the results, see “The FP Survey: The Economy.”   Or in a magazine format:  “If we’re ever going to get out of this slump, what will it take?  We asked more than 60 leading economists to tell us.”   

        Also, here is a recent poll from The Economist, asking similar questions of NBER and NABE economists:   “Asking the Experts,” Oct. 6.

        Mitt Romney, presidential candidate, said in now-infamous comments that 47% of the American electorate is dependent on the federal government, that he will never be able to teach them to take personal responsibility for their lives, and that they are certain to vote for Barack Obama in November.   He continues a tradition in his party that goes back at least three decades:  building political campaigns around the proposition that folks in the heartland exhibit the American virtues of self sufficiency and personal responsibility and the implication that other, more urban, regions display decadent social values and dependency on government.

          It is a good general rule to judge individuals on their own merits and not on the supposed attributes of the racial, socioeconomic or geographic groups to which they belong. Cultural generalizations are dangerous.   But since questions have been raised, the fearless social scientist will not shrink from confronting them.  Are residents of “red states,” who tend to vote Republican, indeed more likely to take responsibility for their personal behavior than those who live in “blue states” and tend to vote Democratic?

       Inspired by the role that religion plays in the red-state view of the world, I will organize the investigation in terms of the Seven Deadly Sins:   Greed, Gluttony, Lust, Sloth, Wrath, and so on.  We will see that measures of these “sins,” state-by-state, bear a statistical relationship with voting patterns - but not the relationship that many assume.  (For data sources and econometric details, see the statistical appendix at my website.)    

1)      Greed  
 
    The red states receive more federal spending, relative to taxes, than the blue states, as I wrote in a 2010 blog post.  Updated data show that the pattern continues.  Those who claim to be fiscally conservative are the ones who in truth tend to feed the most voraciously at the federal trough. Alaskans are the most dependent on the federal government, receiving $7,448 in spending (net of taxes) per capita.  New England, the Mid-Atlantic States, Minnesota and Illinois are the biggest net givers.  Regarding Romney’s specific  ”47%” allegation: the states with high percentages of people who pay no income tax tend to vote Republican, not Democratic.

     Figure 1 shows on the horizontal axis each state’s receipt of spending by the federal government, net of tax payments, per capita.  The vertical axis shows the ratio of Democratic to Republican votes state by state, in the last three presidential elections.    The red states (low in the graph) tend to be on the receiving end (high spending).  The blue states (high in the graph) constitute a majority of the ones that foot the bill (positive contributions to the nationwide kitty).  The relationship is highly significant statistically.
  

Figure 1:  Federal Spending Received minus Taxes Paid, among Blue vs. Red States
(Average of votes in 2000, 2004 and 2008 presidential elections)  Click here for larger image.

2) Gluttony

     States where residents suffer more from obesity, in part because they have worse eating habits, tend to vote Republican, as I showed in a blog post last June.  To illustrate, a mere 1 percentage point decrease in a state’s obesity rate is associated on average with an estimated increase in the ratio of Democratic to Republican voters from 1.00 to 1.07.  The relationship is highly significant statistically.   (Figure 2.)

               
Fig.2: Obesity (% of population) Click for larger image     Fig.3: Fitness Index  Click for larger image  

3) Sloth

     States where residents get less physical exercise tend to vote Republican.  (Figure 10d in appendix.) The relationship is highly significant statistically.    Figure 3 combines physical exercise and lack of obesity into a single index of physical fitness.

      In his recent book, Coming Apart, Charles Murray argues that those who live in the “super-zip codes” - the areas with high education levels, like Belmont, Massachusetts  - have maintained traditional American values of hard work, while those who live elsewhere show “crashing” rates of industriousness.   He writes that those who live in areas with less education have been leaving the labor force for years, often falsely claiming disability. They “goof off,” “sleeping and watching television” (p.180-181).  Those that remain employed have reduced the length of their work-week and their dedication to their jobs, at the same time that those living in the super-zip codes have increased theirs (p.176-77).  Some academic researchers and news media fear accusations of liberal bias if they talk about such things.  AEI scholar Murray may be immune from this fear: he is well-known as a conservative/libertarian whose earlier book The Bell Curve dealt with black-white differences in test achievement.  (The statistics in his recent book look at whites alone, so as to control for race.)   

4) Lust

     Sex is interesting.  Red states residents buy more online adult entertainment, according to a 2009 study in the Journal of Economic Perspectives by Benjamin Edelman.   Notwithstanding proclamations about the importance of pre-marital chastity, evidence suggests that young people in red states do have sex before marriage.  It is less likely to be safe sex than among those in blue states.   States that vote Republican have higher birth rates among 15-17-year-old girls, as Figure 4 shows.   Again, the difference is highly significant statistically.    They also have higher rates of the sexually-transmitted disease Chlamydia .  (This difference, unlike the others, is not statistically significant at the aggregate state level; but it is when combined into an overall measure of unsafe sex.)

      Apparently the gap between what they say and what they do is particularly wide for teen-agers who describe themselves as evangelical Christians.  According to research by Mark Regnerus, a sociologist at the University of Texas, Austin, white evangelical adolescents usually state a belief in pre-marital abstinence — 74 per cent — but in fact are surprisingly active sexually, compared to mainline Protestants and Jews who do not tend to state such a belief.  When the evangelicals do engage in sex, they are less likely to use protection than others.  The gap between word and deed is strikingly high for the millions of teenagers who take a formal pledge to remain celibate until marriage, typically in a ring ceremony, according to a New Yorker article by Margaret Talbott (”Red Sex, Blue Sex“).  The majority of them, though holding out for awhile, “end up having sex before marriage, and not usually with their future spouse.”   Two other sociologists, Peter Bearman (Columbia University) and Hannah Bruckner (Yale) find a positive correlation between the abstinence pledge and Sexually Transmitted Disease (STD).  Pledgers are less likely to use a condom if and when they first have sex and overall are slightly more likely to contract a STD.  (Under George W. Bush, the federal government subsidized such abstinence pledge program despite their questionable effectiveness.)
              

                  
Fig.4: Teen pregnancy rates  Click for larger image         Fig.5: Firearms Assaults  Click for larger image

5) Wrath

     Nobody is surprised to hear that red states have higher rates of gun ownership than blue states.  But there is an important distinction between those who use guns responsibly and those who do not.   The data show that ¾ of the states with high rates of firearms assaults vote Republican.  (Figure 5.)   The regression is statistically significant.

6) Drunkenness  

     People who drink too much endanger themselves and endanger others as well.  You guessed it: States with high rates of fatal accidents from drunk driving tend to vote Republican (Figure 6).     Statistically significant. 

     
Fig.6: Drunk driving fatalities  Click for larger image       Fig.7: Smoking rates  Click for larger image   

7) Smoking

     Finally, states with high rates of smoking vote Republican too, as Figure 7 illustrates.   Again, the relationship is highly significant statistically.   

     Many of the Seven Deadly Sins can indeed be deadly.  It is particularly striking that the states where the most residents exhibit behavior that endangers their health and that of others - with many of these unhealthy people later free-riding on their fellow citizens when they show up uninsured in the hospital emergency room - are also the states where congressmen tended to vote against the Affordable Care Act (Obamacare) in 2010.  This risky behavior includes poor physical fitness (as measured by rates of obesity, lack of exercise, and poor diet), careless sexual behavior (as measured by rates of teen pregnancy and Chlamydia), smoking, drunk-driving (as reflected in fatalities) and irresponsible use of guns (as reflected in armed assaults). 

     Each obese American incurs medical costs 42%  higher than those of normal weight.  Often others are stuck with the bill, if the patient has not been able to get health insurance because of a weight problem.  These people are free-riders on the health care system even if they don’t want to be.   The individual mandate of Obamacare was designed to fix this free-riding problem and re-establish personal responsibility.  Yet congressmen in states with high rates of obesity or other health risk factors voted against the legislation.  (See my blogpost or an op-ed on Obamacare for the evidence.)   

     Utah is the most conspicuous outlier in most of these relationships.  It has a high population of Mormons. Apparently they follow the strictures of their religion more closely than those of other religious denominations.  (Could this be why evangelicals tend to resent Mormons so much, according to opinion polls?)   But Utah notwithstanding, the relationships hold on average.

     The five most “red” states are Wyoming, Oklahoma, Utah, Idaho, and Alaska.  The five most “blue” are New York, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Vermont and Hawaii.   The average score of the five reddest states is worse in each category than the average score of the five bluest states: more obesity, smoking, Chlamydia, teenage pregnancy, drunk driving fatalities, and firearms assaults.  In the latter three of those measures, the “reckless” shares of the population are almost twice as high among the first five states as among the last five.  While we are at it, we might as well acknowledge that the red state populations also tend to be less educated and more prone to divorce. 

     There you have it, the surprising statistics.  ”Let he who is without sin cast the first stone.”

[This article draws in part on an op-ed concerning Obamacare in the Christian Science Monitor and another concerning Romney's "47%" remarks at Project Syndicate.    VoxEU also has a version.   Details on data and computations are available in a posted statistical appendix.]  

Once again this morning, the BLS employment release tells conflicting stories depending on whether one looks at the unemployment rate or job growth.   The U.S. unemployment rate fell from 8.3% in July to 8.1% in August, continuing the gradual three-year downward trend (from its 2009 peak at 10 %).     Political economy equations often say that the direction of movement of the unemployment rate in the period preceding a presidential election is the main economic determinant of whether the incumbent is re-elected.  

“Are we better off than we were four years ago?”   Yes.   If the criterion is to be a narrow unemployment comparison, and one counts from the month following the day Obama took the oath of office, then we are now at a lower unemployment rate.   But that is very simple-minded as a criterion.   (Look at GDP.  Better yet look at how the free-fall turned around  and the recession ended within his first 5 months.)

Employment growth is the more important statistic, to evaluate the progress of the economic recovery.  Here today’s BLS report was disappointing: only 96,000 jobs created.    The jobs number climbs into six digits if one looks at private sector employment growth.  

By the way, am I the only one who sees a general bias toward negativity in the media?   When the unemployment number looks bad and job creation looks good, like a month ago, the newspapers seem to headline the former.   When the unemployment rate looks good and employment disappoints, as this time around, they tend to focus on the latter.  The TV shows do the same (including those on which I appear).

In any case, as always, one should look at a longer run trend.   The fact is that private sector job growth has been running at an annual rate of 162,000 per month over the last two years.    This is far greater than the rate during the Bush Administration even if one looks only at the years in between the Bush recessions of 2001 and 2008  (83,000 per month, on average, from November 2001 to December 2007.)   It is not enough.  For example it is much less than the rate during the Clinton Administration, month in, month out (218,000 private sector jobs created per month, on average).  But it is a big improvement over where we were.

On the subject of Bill Clinton.  His speech to the Democratic Convention  Wednesday night again demonstrated his unique ability to explain wonkish policy details in a folksy way.    This included pointing out the statistics on private sector job creation under Democratic presidents since 1961 compared to Republican Presidents.   The rate has been just over twice as great.   Thus the current Obama-Bush comparison continues a half-century tradition.

The point about private sector job expansion looking better than overall employment growth is of course what Obama was trying to say in June when he made his unfortunately worded statement that “the private sector is doing fine.”   He quickly retracted that language, which was the right thing to do.  But the point still needs to be made.

Why look at private sector jobs, instead of total jobs?    I have a feeling that this is a Republican way of looking at things.  The Republicans don’t seem to believe there is anything amiss if a million public sector workers lose their jobs.  (Which is what has happened over the last year:  934,000.)    Teachers, firefighters, construction workers…   Apparently those don’t  count as real jobs because they are in the public sector.    That would explain the Republican congressional opposition to Obama’s initial fiscal stimulus in 2009 (the one that ended the recession) and their more successful subsequent attempts to block Obama’s job proposals.  

So maybe we should be looking at total employment after all, rather than private employment.  Or even focusing on the underemployed and discouraged workers.  But these are all reasons why we need to resume enacting the policies that Obama has been trying to enact.

     I have argued that the best way to think of “black swan” events is as developments that, even though low-probability, can in fact be contemplated ahead of time.  Even if they are the sort of thing that has never happened before within an analyst’s memory, similar things may have happened before in the distant past or in other countries.   

     What current possible shocks have probabilities that, even if fairly low, are high enough to warrant thinking about now?  Some have been discussed ad infinitum, others hardly at all.

• Most widely discussed is the danger of a break-up of the euro. Considered unthinkable a short time ago, the probability that one or more euro members will drop out is now well above 50%. Currency unions have disintegrated before.
• Another is the possibility of a hard landing in China, analogous to the crisis that hit Korea and other East Asian markets in 1997.
• An oil crisis in the Mideast is the classic black swan event. Each one catches us by surprise: 1956, 1973, 1979, and 1990 (among others). Oil prices can rise for lots of reasons, not just crises in the Mideast, and have done so in recent years. But the most likely crisis scenarios currently stem from either military conflict with Iran or instability in some Arab government. The threatened loss of supply to world markets typically shows up as a sharp increase in demand for oil inventories and thus in prices.
• The most worrisome financial threat is a crash of currently over-priced bond markets. In theory such a crash could be precipitated by inflation (particularly commodity-induced inflation as in 1973 or 1979). But this seems unlikely. More likely triggers are (i) a breakdown in the eurozone or (ii) political dysfunction in Washington. A default in Greece or some other Mediterranean country could trigger a global debt crisis any time. The evidence of extreme dysfunction in US politics is already there for all to see, in the attempts by some politicians to repeat the macroeconomic policy mistakes of 1937 and in the debt-ceiling show-down of August 2011 (which led S&P to downgrade US government credit rating from AAA to AA). The obvious crunch date comes after the American election, as the “fiscal cliff” approaches in the last two months of this year. In theory, fears of what will happen January 1 should lead investors to start dumping bonds now. But it is still considered a sign of sophistication in financial markets to opine that, precisely because the consequences of going over the cliff would be so bad, the politicians will again find a last-minute way to avoid it. In truth, the fact that we haven’t gone over the cliff before does not necessarily mean we won’t this time. Perhaps observers think that a clear result in the election, one way or the other, would help settle things. A true black swan in the mix would be a repeat in November of the disputed 2000 presidential election; there has been no reform in the meantime to assure people that their votes will be counted or that a disputed outcome would be resolved by independent institutions rather than by interested political appointees.
• Scariest on the list is a terrorist attack with weapons of mass destruction. When politicians have used the specter of a September 11 repeat to scare the American public into supporting unhelpful policy responses, the mistake has been in the unhelpful policy responses, not in the “scare” part. There is long-standing gap between the probability of a nuclear event as perceived by terrorism experts and the probability as perceived by the public. Admittedly the probability is lower now that Osama bin Laden is dead.
• Last on this list is an unprecedented climate disaster. Environmentalists sometimes underestimate the benefits of technological and economic progress when they reason that a finite supply of resources must of necessity be exhausted eventually. But the disbelievers are just as faulty in their reasoning that because a global climate disaster has not happened in the past it can’t happen in the future.

       Throughout history, big economic and political shocks have often occurred in August, when leaders had gone on vacation in the belief that world affairs were quiet.   Examples of geopolitical jolts that came in August include the outbreak of World War I, the Nazi-Soviet pact of 1939 and the Berlin Wall in 1961.  Subsequent examples of economic and other surprises in August have included the Nixon shock of 1971 (when the American president enacted wage-price controls, took the dollar off gold, and imposed trade controls), 1982 eruption in Mexico of the international debt crisis, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the 1991 Soviet coup, 1992 crisis in the European Exchange Rate Mechanism, Hurricane Katrina in 2005, and US subprime mortgage crisis of 2007.   Many of these shocks constituted events that had previously not even appeared on most radar screens. They were considered unthinkable. 

The phrase “black swans” has come to be used to mean a very unlikely event of this sort.  Managers of Long Term Capital Management in 1998 or of most major banks in 2008 have suggested that they could not be expected to have allowed for a financial collapse such as the one that followed the default of Russia or the one that followed the bursting of the US housing bubble, because it was a “7-standard deviation event,” that is, an event of inconceivably tiny probability…in the realm of the probability that two major meteors hit the earth at the same time.   This is nonsense.  If the statistical model says the probability of a financial crisis is that low, it is the model that is wrong.  This is like the case when “hundred-year floods” turn up every few years.

A bit more enlightened are people who talk about Knightian uncertainty or “unknown unknowns.” Ignorance with humility is better than ignorance without it.    A still better interpretation is that statistical distributions have “fat tails,” in technical terms.  But it would be nice to get beyond the Jurassic Park lesson (”don’t be surprised if things go wrong”), to be able to say intelligent things about what causes tail events. 

       What does “black swan” really mean?   In my view, it should refer to an event that is considered virtually impossible by those whose frame of reference is limited in time span and geographical area, but that is well within the probability distribution for those whose data set includes other countries besides their own and other decades or centuries. 

      Consider five examples of mistakes made by those whose memory did not extend beyond a few years or decades of personal experience in a small number of countries.

1. “All swans are white.”  The origin of the black swan metaphor was the belief that all swans were white, a conclusion that might have been reached by a 19^th century Englishman based on a lifetime of personal observation and David Hume’s principle of induction.   But ornithologists already knew that there in fact existed black swans in Australia, having discovered them in 1697.  A 19^th-century Englishman encountering a black swan for the first time might have considered it an event of unthinkably low probability, even though the relevant information to the contrary had already been available in ornithology books.  It seems a waste of an excellent metaphor to use the term just to mean a highly unexpected event.  A better use of “black swan” would be to mean an event that would not have been quite so unexpected ex ante if forecasters had cast their data net over a broader set of countries and a longer time perspective.

 2. “Terrorists don’t blow up big office buildings.”   Before September 11, 2001, some terrorist experts warned that foreign terrorists might try to blow up tall American office buildings.   These warnings were not taken seriously by those in power at the time.   Many Americans did not know the history of terrorist events taking place in other countries and in other decades.  

 3. “Housing prices don’t fall.” Many Americans up to 2006 based their behavior on the assumption that nominal housing prices, even if they slowed down, would not fall.   After all, “they never had before,” which meant that they had not fallen in living memory in the United States.   They may not have been aware that housing prices had often fallen in other countries, and in the US before the 1940s.  Needless to say, many a decision would have been made very differently, whether by indebted homeowners or leveraged bank executives, if they had thought there was a non-negligible chance of an outright decline in prices.

 4. “Volatilities are low.”   During the years 2004-06, financial markets perceived market risk as very low.  This was most nakedly visible in the implicit volatilities in options prices such as the VIX.  But it was also manifest in junk bond spreads, sovereign spreads, and many other financial prices.  One of the reasons for this historic mis-pricing of risk is that traders were plugging into their Black-Scholes formulas estimates of variances that went back only a few years, or at most a few decades (the period of the late “Great Moderation”).  They should have gone back much farther - or better yet, formed judgments based on a more comprehensive assessment of what risks might lie in wait for the world economy.

 5. “Big banks don’t fail.”   ”Governments of advanced countries don’t default.”   ”European governments don’t default.”  Enough said.  Greece’s debt troubles, in particular, should not have caught anyone by surprise, least of all northern Europeans.   The perception was that euro countries were fundamentally different from emerging markets, that like Germany they were free of default risk.  Suddenly, in 2010, the Greek sovereign spread shot up, exceeding 800% by June. But even when the Greek crisis erupted, leaders in Brussels and Frankfurt seemed to view it as a black swan, instead of recognizing it as a close cousin of the Argentine crisis of ten years earlier, the Mexican crisis of 1994, and many others in history, including among European countries.

      My next blog post will list some of the shocks that, even though low-probability, have high enough probability that they should be treated as thinkable rather than unthinkable, they would have great consequences, and they therefore warrant some advance preparation.

The BLS this morning reported U.S. job gains of 163,000 in July, which is good news in the eyes of the financial markets.  The jobs data had been disappointing over the preceding three spring months.  Before that, during the winter months, employment growth was strong.

In terms of perceptions and politics, pundits will say that today’s report is good news for Obama’s re-election prospects, just as they said the spring jobs numbers were bad news for the President.  But my interest is in economics and reality, rather than perceptions and politics.   From a longer-term perspective, a few important facts have not been adequately discussed.

• 1. The rate of job growth over the last two years, 137,000 jobs per month, inadequate as it is, has actually been greater than the rate of job growth during the George W. Bush Administration (101,000 per month) even if one excludes the two Bush recessions that occurred in the first and last years of his administration, respectively.   The Obama Administration looks even better if one confines the numbers to private sector employment, since the government has been shedding jobs under Obama and was growing rapidly under Bush. Of course this is still nothing like the sort of progress we would ideally want to see - say, the 237,000 jobs that were created month in and month out on average during the 8 years of the Clinton Administration. And the number of long-term unemployed remains worryingly high. But the situation is a big improvement over the economy that Obama inherited three years ago.  

• 2. An unemployment rate of 8.3% shows that the economy is still in unsatisfactory shape.   (The July numbers show a rise from 8.21 to 8.25, which the BLS labelled “essentially unchanged” in the first sentence of its release.)   Unemployment remains higher than what the Obama Administration hoped we would have by now at the time it took office in January 2009.  Most of the difference can be explained by the fact that the level of economic activity in January 2009 - as a result of the free-fall in the last part of 2008 - was much worse than was realized at the time. The subsequent downward revision by the Commerce Department in the official statistic for the level of GDP at the start of 2009 can explain why the level of the economy is disappointing 3 ½ years later, more than the rate of growth over the intervening period. After all, those horrendous 2008 rates of decline in GDP and employment turned around during the six months immediately following the day Obama took office.  

• 3. Most private-sector and independent economists agree that the Obama fiscal stimulus made a positive difference; that - together with TARP and monetary easing by the Fed, unpopular as they are in some circles — it helps explain the mid-2009 economic turnaround; and that it helps explain the moderate growth that followed (2 ½ % growth p.a. in the 2nd half of 2009 plus 2010).   A good explanation for the disappointingly slow rate of growth in output and employment since the end of 2010 is that the fiscal stimulus has been withdrawn and the government sector has been contracting. (Since the November 2010 election, there have been enough Republicans in Congress to block the American Jobs Act and every other action that Obama proposes.)  One can see this in the composition of both GDP and employment. Today’s jobs report features another 9,000 jobs cut in state, local, and federal governments, continuing the pattern that has held throughout the recovery: jobs and output in manufacturing and the rest of the private sector have been expanding, partially offset by contraction in the public sector.

     My preceding post bemoaned the tendency for many US politicians to exhibit a procyclicalist pattern:    supporting tax cuts and spending increases when the economy is booming, which should be the time to save money for a rainy day, and then re-discovering the evils of budget deficits only in times of recession, thus supporting fiscal contraction at precisely the wrong time.  Procyclicalists exacerbate the magnitude of the swings in the business cycle.        This is not just an American problem.  A similar unfortunate cycle — large fiscal deficits when the economy is already expanding anyway, followed by fiscal contraction in response to a recession — has also been visible in the United Kingdom and euroland in recent years.   Greece and Portugal are the two most infamous examples. But the larger European countries, as well, failed to take advantage of the expansionary period 2003-07 to strengthen their public finances, and instead ran budget deficits in excess of the limits (3% of GDP) that they were supposed to obey under the Stability and Growth Pact. Then, over the last few years, politicians in both the UK and the continent have made their recessions worse by imposing aggressive fiscal austerity at precisely the wrong time.      Historically, developing countries used to be the ones where dysfunctional political systems produced procyclical fiscal policies.  Almost all of them showed a positive correlation between government spending and the business cycle during the period 1960-1999.  But things have changed.   Remarkably, during the decade 2000-2010, about a third of emerging market governments - in countries such as China, Chile, Malaysia, Korea, Botswana, and Indonesia - managed to reverse the historical correlation.  They took advantage of the boom years 2003-2007 to strengthen their budget positions, saving up for a rainy day.  They were thus in a good position to ease up when the global recession hit them in 2008-09.        In fact a majority of the governments that have followed countercyclical spending policies since 2000 are in emerging market or developing countries.   They figured out how to achieve countercyclicality during the last decade, precisely the decade when so many politicians in “advanced countries” forgot how to.

       The world is in the grip of a debate between fiscal austerity and fiscal stimulus.  Opponents of austerity worry about contractionary effects on the economy.  Opponents of stimulus worry about indebtedness and moral hazard.

Is austerity good or bad?   It is as foolish to debate this proposition as it would be to debate whether it is better for a driver to turn left or right.   It depends where the car is on the road. Sometimes left is appropriate, sometimes right.  When an economy is in a boom, the government should run a surplus; other times, when in recession, it should run a deficit.    

True, it is hard for politicians to get the timing of countercyclical fiscal policy exactly right.  This is the reason, more than any other, why Keynesian policy lost its luster.  “Fine-tuning” it was called.  Sometimes the fiscal stimulus would kick in after the recession was already over.   

But this is no reason to follow a pro-cyclical fiscal policy.  A procyclical fiscal policy piles on the spending and tax cuts on top of booms, but reduces spending and raises taxes in response to downturns.  Budgetary profligacy during expansion; austerity in recessions.  Procyclical fiscal policy is destabilizing, because it worsens the dangers of overheating, inflation, and asset bubbles during the booms and exacerbates the losses in output and employment during the recessions.  In other words, a procyclical fiscal policy magnifies the severity of the business cycle.

Yet many politicians in the United States, the United Kingdom, and the eurozone seem to live by procyclicality. They argue against fiscal discipline when the economy is strong, only to become deficit hawks when the economy is weak.  Exactly backwards.

            Consider the positions taken over the last three decades by some American politicians. 

First cycle:    During a recessionary period, President Ronald Reagan in his 1980 campaign and in his 1981 Inaugural Address urged immediate action to reduce the national debt “beginning today.”  (Recession: austerity.)    But in 1988, as the economy approached the peak of the business cycle, candidate George H.W. Bush was unconcerned about budget deficits, even though the national debt was rapidly approaching three times the level it had been when Reagan had given his speeches.   “Read my lips, no new taxes,” Bush famously said.  (Boom: profligacy.)

Second cycle:  Predictably, the first President Bush and the Congress finally summoned the political will to raise taxes and rein in spending growth at precisely the wrong moment, that is, just as the US was entering another recession in 1990.   (Recession: austerity.)  Although the timing of the legislation was poor, the action was courageous.    The Pay as You Go Rule and other reforms switched government finances back onto a path that eventually was to eliminate the deficits by the end of the decade.   

But three years later — and even though the most robust recovery in American history had begun — every Republican congressman voted against Clinton’s 1993 legislation to continue Bush’s spending caps, PAYGO, and tax increases.  Nor did they change their minds in response to the subsequent success of the policy.   Even after seven years of strong growth, with unemployment at the peak of the business cycle dipping below 4% for the first time since the 1960s, George W. Bush based his 2000 campaign on a platform of large long-term tax cuts. (Boom: profligacy.)

Third cycle:  Even after the Bush fiscal expansion had turned the inherited record budget surpluses into record deficits, the Administration went for a 2^nd round of tax cuts in 2003, and continued a rate of growth of spending that was triple the rate under Clinton (both national security and domestic spending).  Vice President Richard Cheney said “Reagan proved that deficits don’t matter.”   These policies were maintained for five more years, as another $ four trillion was added to the national debt.  (Boom: profligacy.)  

Predictably, when the worst recession since the Great Depression hit in 2007-09, politicians felt constrained from an adequate fiscal response due to the big deficits and debts the government had already been running. Republicans suddenly re-discovered the evil of budget deficits and decided that retrenchment was urgent.  They opposed Obama’s initial fiscal stimulus in February 2009, even though GDP growth and employment were much worse than they had been when Reagan and Bush had launched their tax cuts and spending increases.  (Recession: austerity.)   Subsequently, with a new majority in the House, they succeeded in blocking further efforts by Obama when the stimulus ran out in 2011.  The government spending cutbacks of the last two years are the most important reason, in my view, why the economic recovery which began in June 2009 subsequently stalled in 2011.

Three cycles.   Three generations of politicians who favored expansionary fiscal policies during a boom and then decided after a recession had hit that budget deficits were bad after all.  (See the graph below.)

This is not to say that the procyclicalist politicians have always succeeded in getting their policies adopted.   Clinton had a strong enough congressional majority in August 1993 that he was able to pass his budget balancing legislation (Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act) — even though every Republican in Congress voted “no” at a time when the economy was expanding.  Similarly, Obama had a strong enough majority in January 2009 that he was able to pass some initial fiscal stimulus (the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act), without a single Republican vote, at a time when the economy was in freefall.  But too often the countercyclicalists are overpowered by the procyclicalists.

            Trying to turn left or right at precisely the wrong points in the road is a worse record than one would get by switching policies randomly.  To explain this perverse pattern, let us switch metaphors in mid-stream.   It is the old problem of needing to fix the hole in the roof when the sun is shining, rather than waiting for a storm to realize that it is necessary.  When the economy is booming, there is no political support for painful spending cuts or tax increases.  After all, everything seems fine; why make a change?   Then when the deluge comes, sinners suddenly see the evils of their ways and proclaim the necessity of reforming.  Of course it is very difficult to fix the roof in the middle of a thunderstorm.

Procyclical Politicians:  Support for fiscal contraction (down-arrows) and fiscal expansion (up-arrows) 

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     The Supreme Court today upheld the Affordable Care Act of 2010, otherwise known as Obamacare.  Judging from the polls, American public opinion appears to be very sharply divided over the legislation.  Some view it as socialism, others as the first success in a half-century of efforts to achieve a sensible national policy on health care.

       What explains the wide divergence of views?   An economists’ approach - cynical or naïve depending on how you look at it - would be to assume that citizens vote according to their own personal interests.   Getting the uninsured onto paid insurance through the individual mandate is very much in some people’s interest, but not necessarily as strongly in others’ interests.  Let’s take a look.

       Those who have the most to gain from President Obama’s health care legislation are those who have a pre-existing condition or are pre-disposed to illness, for example because they are overweight.  They are more likely to need medical care in the future, but can be charged higher rates if they try to buy private insurance, by virtue of their condition.  Or they can be excluded completely.   (Each obese American incurs medical costs 42% higher than those of normal weight.)     

         Figure 1:  States with higher obesity rates tend to oppose the Affordable Care Act     

     I show how Congressmen from each state voted on the Affordable Care Act on the vertical axis of Figure 1, with the state rates of obesity on the horizontal axis.   There is a statistically significant relationship.  But the relationship goes the other way:    states where more people are overweight, such as Mississippi, Alabama, South Carolina and Texas, are more likely to oppose Obamacare.   In those parts of the country where people are slimmer, such as New England, New York and Colorado, there is strong support for health care reform.  For every one percentage point increase in obesity, support for Obamacare declines by an estimated four percentage points on average.

     Obesity is partly genetic, of course, but also is determined by habits of exercise and eating.  The states where residents get the most physical exercise are Minnesota, Utah, Oregon, Washington and Vermont; the states that get the least are Mississippi,  Tennessee,  Kentucky,  Lousiana and Alabama.   Another data source tells us the states with bad eating habits:  the five worst-ranking are Mississippi, Alabama, Missouri, Kansas and Oklahoma.

      There are some outliers, of course.   Utah’s population appears to be physically fit (and to do well by other measures that we will be looking at later), while opposing the Affordable Care Act and voting Republican.   Mormons look exceptional in the extent to which they abide in their personal lives by the strictures of their religion.   Could this be why evangelicals tend to resent Mormons so much according to opinion polls?  

       It’s not just obesity and exercise.  The states that rank the best on an overall health index are Vermont, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Maine and Iowa.  The states where people are the least healthy overall are Louisiana, Mississippi, New Mexico, Nevada, Oklahoma and Texas.  The weight of the evidence is fairly clear: the states where people are most in need of help getting private insurance are the states opposing the legislation that helps them do that.    (I hope in future blogs to look at such other specific risk factors as unprotected sex, drunk driving, and smoking habits.)

      It seems that the economists’ view of the world is wrong.  People are not voting in their self interest.  What is going on here?

       I can think of two plausible explanations as to why those who stand to benefit from Obamacare should oppose it politically:   (1) lack of knowledge regarding the bill, and (2) partisanship.  

       Most people don’t know what Obama’s bill does.  Many think that it reduces personal responsibility for health care.  But the truth is the opposite.  Under the current system, hospitals are required to treat patients who show up at the emergency entrance with a heart attack - even if their condition is partly their fault, due to habits of overeating and under-exercising.  The hospitals have to pass the costs on, and the rest of us end up footing the bill.   The individual mandate is designed to fix that, by making everyone pay for the health care they get (and perhaps even encouraging them to see a doctor who will advise them to adopt a healthy life style).  Establishing personal responsibility, not socialized medicine, is the reason why conservative think tanks such as the Heritage Foundation proposed the idea of the ndividual mandate in the first place, and why Mitt Romney enacted it in Massachusettts.   But most people still seem unaware of this.  If people do not understand their economic interests, that may explain why the voting patterns do not line up correspondingly. 

       The other, not inconsistent, explanation, is that people are voting along simple party lines.   Figure 2 shows the popular vote in the 2008 presidential election on the vertical axis, state by state.   The states where people are most likely to be overweight or obese tend to vote Republican.  Evidently the people in New England, New York, Hawaii and DC, who tend to vote Democratic, are slimmer.   A one percentage point increase in the obesity rate is estimated to raise the ratio of Republican to Democratic voters from 1.00 to 1.06 (easily enough to swing an election). The statistical confidence interval — “margin of error” – is thin enough to exclude the possibility of a zero effect.      

                 Figure 2:   States with higher obesity rates tend to vote Republican                                 

        Ideology is much less important than party affiliation.  This is the same result when one looks at which states receive more federal subsidies: despite all the rhetoric about “getting the government off our backs,” it is the red states, i.e., those where people vote Republican, that receive the most transfers from Washington.  Alaska, Mississippi, Louisiana, West Virginia, and the Dakotas top the list.   The Democratic-leaning states are the ones paying into the federal government and subsidizing everyone else:  New England, New York, New Jersey, California.   Those who claim to be fiscally conservative are the ones who in fact tend to feed voraciously at the public trough.

[Econometric results are available in an appendix.]