Politicians who advertise themselves as “fiscal conservatives” sometimes campaign on crowd-pleasing pledges to cut taxes and simultaneously reduce budget deficits.  These are difficult promises to deliver on in practice, since the budget deficit equals government spending minus tax revenue.

Aspiring fiscal conservatives may be interested in learning four innovative tricks that are commonly used by American politicians who like to promise what seems impossible.   Each of these feats has been perfected over three decades or more.  Indeed they first acquired their colorful names in the early years of the Ronald Reagan presidency:

1. The “Magic Asterisk”
2. “Rosy Scenario”
3. The Laffer hypothesis
4. The “Starve the Beast” hypothesis.

As shop-worn as these four conjuring tricks are, voters and journalists continue to fall for them. Thus they remain useful equipment in the repertoire of the fiscal conservative.

The first term was coined by Reagan’s Budget Director, David Stockman.  Originally it was an act of desperation, because the numbers in the 1981 budget plan didn’t add up.  “We invented the ‘magic asterisk’:  If we couldn’t find the savings in time - and we couldn’t-we would issue an IOU. We would call it ‘Future savings to be identified.’” [p.124]   Since that time the Magic Asterisk has become a familiar device in the American policy arena.   Recent examples include the recommendation of the Simpson-Bowles commission to cut real spending growth by precise amounts, without saying where.   US Presidential candidate Mitt Romney has done the same in his spending plan.    Another current application of the Magic Asterisk is Romney’s plan to eliminate enough tax expenditures to make up the revenue lost by cutting marginal tax rates by 20% (which is $5 trillion in revenue), while steadfastly refusing to say what tax expenditures he would eliminate.

As Election Day nears, the pressure on a candidate to get more specific grows.  The conjurer is thus forced to go to Trick Two:  since he can’t find enough tax loopholes to eliminate, he must claim that what he meant by closing the revenue gap was that stronger economic growth will bring in the added revenue.   The most popular magician’s assistant of all time makes her encore on the stage.  Murray Weidenbaum, Reagan’s first Council of Economic Advisers Chairman, deserves the credit for originally dreaming up Ms. Rosy Scenario, “perhaps my most lasting legacy” [p.57].  The Reagan Administration in its early years forecast 5% income growth (twice the long-run average), in order to imply in its projections a boost to revenues big enough to make up for its many tax cut measures [p.93-97].   Since then candidates of every party have made use of Rosy’s talents.

Indeed official growth forecasts are systematically overly optimistic in almost all of a sample of 33 countries, contributing to overly optimistic budget forecasts.   European governments are particularly biased.

In the Republican primaries last year, candidate Tim Pawlenty assumed a 5 per cent growth rate to make his own plan work.   He was all but laughed out of the race.  Mitt Romney probably can’t get away with this sleight-of-hand either.   The press asks, “Why should we believe that the growth rate will magically accelerate just because you become president?   Where will this GDP come from?   It sounds like pulling a rabbit out of a hat.”  Right on cue, it is time for Trick 3.

Trick 3 is the famous Laffer Hypothesis.   This is the proposition, identified with “supply side economics,” that reductions in tax rates are like magic beans:  they stimulate economic growth a lot — so much so that total tax revenue (the tax rate times income) goes up rather than down.   One might think that the Romney campaign would never resurrect such a hoary and discredited trick.  After all, two of his main economic advisers, Glenn Hubbard and Greg Mankiw, both have textbooks in which they say that the Laffer Hypothesis is incorrect as a description of US tax rates.  Mankiw’s book, in its first edition, even called its proponents “charlatans.”  But the historical record is that each Republican presidential candidate since Reagan has had good economic advisers who disavow the Laffer Hypothesis.  Yet time and again the president (or candidate), and his vice president (or running mate) and his political aides read from a script that relies on the Laffer logic (Appendix I). They are the ones who make the policy if the candidate wins, not the academic economist.   George W. Bush had these same two top economic advisers in his first term, Hubbard and Mankiw, when he cut taxes and transmogrified a record surplus into a record deficit.

Trick 4, “Starve the Beast,” typically comes later, if and when the president is elected, has enacted his tax cuts, and discovers that smoke and mirrors don’t work against hard fiscal reality. He can’t find enough spending to cut (Magic Asterisk has disappeared up the conjurer’s sleeve); the acceleration in GDP is nowhere to be seen (Rosy Scenario has vanished in thin air); and tax revenues have not grown (no rabbit in the Laffer hat).   The audience is now told that losing tax revenue and widening the budget deficit was the plan all along.  The performer explains that the deficit is all the fault of Congress for not cutting spending and that the only way to tame the beast is raise the budget deficit because “Congress can’t spend money it doesn’t have.”  This trick never works either, of course.  Congress can in fact spend money it doesn’t have, especially if the “conservative” president has been quietly sending it budgets every year that call for that.   “Starve the Beast” as a budget strategy, like the other three, dates back to the first Reagan Administration. (Bartlett, 2007, p.6-7.)

By the time the crowd realizes it has been had, the confidence man has pulled off the greatest trick of all:  yet another audience who came to see the deficit shrunk instead leaves the theater with the deficit bigger than when it came in.

References
Bruce Bartlett, 2007, “‘Starve the Beast’ Origins and Development of a Budgetary Metaphor,”The Independent Review, XII, 1, summer, 5-26.
Jeffrey Frankel, 2008, “Snake-Oil Tax Cuts,” Economic Policy Institute, Briefing Paper 221, September.
–2011, “Over-optimism in Forecasts by Official Budget Agencies and Its Implications,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy vol.27, no. 4, 536-562. NBER WP 17239; Summary in NBER Digest.
David Stockman, 1986, The Triumph of Politics: Why the Reagan Revolution Failed (Harper & Row).
Murray Weidenbaum, 2005, Advising Reagan: Making Economic Policy, 1981-82 (Washington Univ., St.Louis).

[A version of this column appeared earlier at Project Syndicate, which has the copyright.  Comments can be posted there.]

The National Journal asks what would happen if the Pledge to America, proposed last week by congressional Republicans, were fully implemented.

     As I understand it, the authors of the “Pledge to America” want not just to renew permanently all Bush-era tax cuts, but also to balance the budget while exempting social security, Medicare, and military spending.   To ask what would be the effects if the Republicans put this pledge into law is to ask what would be the effects if they repeal the laws of arithmetic.   It can’t be done.  All the money is in the parts of the budget they are putting off limits.  (That is what we all assume they mean by “common sense exceptions for seniors, veterans and troops” when cutting spending.  Admittedly, it is hard to tell what they are really proposing, due to the usual lack of specifics in the 21-page document.) 

      We have been through all this before.  Two experiments are most memorable.  First, Ronald Reagan was elected on his pledge of balancing the budget while cutting taxes, which soon produced what were at the time the biggest budget deficits in history.   Then the same thing happened when George W. Bush took office; but he broke the Reagan records for increases in the deficit.  

     I am convinced that if the Republicans, running on the supposed fiscal conservatism of the “Pledge,” were to sweep control of Washington, we would soon have larger deficits than if Obama were calling the shots.  And not just because Obama would raise taxes.   (He may not ever raise them at all, relative to current law, incidentally.  His current proposal is to cut them relative to current law.)     Rather we would probably get a faster rate of growth of spending under the Republicans, just as spending grew more than twice as rapidly under Presidents Reagan and Bush as it did under Clinton.

     It is not only Republican presidential candidates who pledge “small government” and then do the opposite.   It is true of Republican Congressmen too.    A 2004 study of the 258 members of Congress who signed an unconditional Pledge not to raise taxes found that they on average voted for greater increases in spending than those who did not sign the pledge.    Still not convinced?   One more fact:    Congressmen in those states that vote Republican tend to take home a significantly higher level of federal dollars for their states (relative, for example, to taxes paid) than those states that vote Democratic.    

     What is the explanation for the consistent pattern, over the few decades, that the pledge candidates, those who talk the loudest about the need for fiscal conservatism, in practice do the least to achieve it?   After all this time, I still don’t know for sure.    The explanation used to be that the Republican politicians believed one or the other of two erroneous theories:  the Laffer Hypothesis that cutting tax rates would generate more tax revenue, or the Starve the Beast Hypothesis that lower tax revenue would lead to lower spending.  But I haven’t heard either of these claims this time around.  

      Perhaps the true explanation all along is that pledge politicians are under the impression that cutting spending is as easy as waving a magic wand.  The candidates don’t realize that to reduce the deficit one must begin by looking at the numbers and one must end up with constituents who are furious at having lost benefits.  It takes numeracy, competence, experience, and guts.  It takes concrete measures such as those that yielded budget surpluses by the end of the 1990s.  Perhaps when pledge candidates get into office, they are unprepared for the difficulty of the task.

Personal saving rose again in the second quarter. “Does this mean the stimulus tax cut has failed, as the 2008 tax cut stimulus did?”, asks The National Journal.

My answer:

Martin Feldstein and others predicted that the tax-cut component of the 2009 fiscal stimulus package would have substantially less expansionary bang-for-the-buck than the spending component of the package, because much of the tax cut would be saved, as had been the case with the 2008 tax cut.  (“Bang for the buck” in this case could be defined as demand stimulus divided by budget cost.)   We knew this from Milton Friedman’s permanent income hypothesis, or even from good old Keynesian multiplier theory.

But in February President Obama had to get those last three (Republican) votes to pass the stimulus bill in the Senate, and those three Senators insisted on raising the tax cut component of the stimulus package a bit and lowering the spending component. Their motivation presumably was to mollify their fellow Republicans, many of whom still claim that ONLY tax cuts provide stimulus, and that spending does not (and perhaps even has a negative effect) — which is even more extreme than the claim that a tax cut creates stimulus equal to spending. After the failures of the Bush tax cuts (and Reagan’s before him), I don’t know if any economists still cling to such “supply sider” notions — or indeed if these congressmen would be able to state their logic. Regardless, I think the Feldstein prediction has been borne out since then.   Talk about irony!   The Reagan tax cuts of 1981-83 and the Bush tax cuts of 2001-03 were both explicitly designed to boost saving — hence their focus on capital income and higher income brackets — and yet in both cases private saving fell in their aftermath.   The tax cuts of January 2008 and February 2009 were both explicitly designed to boost consumption; yet private saving rose in their aftermath !   

Fortunately, the majority of the Obama stimulus package took the form of increased spending, much of which has yet to come.

None of this is to deny that efficiency is an important consideration, and cost-benefit calculations should always enter into the choice of both what kind of tax cuts to adopt and what kind of spending increases to adopt. But if it is short-term demand stimulus we are after, and we are, then government spending gives more bang for the buck than tax cuts.

[Any readers wishing to post a comment are encouraged to go to the versions on Seeking Alpha or RGE Monitor.]

A panel on Supply Side Economics in Washington, September 12, included statistics on the superior performance of the American economy under President Clinton compared to his Republican successor. (The graph to the right, from Ettlinger & Irons, shows the first term of each administration.  The growth gap during the second terms was even wider.)  Former Treasury Secretary Larry Summers gave some statistics that included Democratic versus Republican presidents throughout the postwar period.   As others have also pointed out, the Democratic record dominates to a surprising extent.   (The event was jointly sponsored by the Center for American Progress and the Economic Policy Institute.)

 By coincidence, in a column in that day’s Wall Street Journal, Donald Luskins sought to “get something settled once and for all. Have the stock markets and the economy historically done better under Democrats or Republicans?”

 These matters are not solely of interest to historians or economists.   The presidential campaign of Senator John McCain appears set to drive its wagon down the same road in which Reagan and Bush have already worn deep ruts.   The candidate is apparently selling the same snake oil:  he says he believes that tax cuts increase revenues.   His principle policy director disavows the Laffer Principle, just as the economists who advised Presidents Reagan and Bush did.   But the views of the economic advisers are not what determines what these presidents do. 

“The Queen in Alice in Wonderland  said that, with practice, she was able to believe as many as six impossible things before breakfast.   Most of us are more limited in our capacity for credulity.  If John McCain believes both the Laffer Proposition (tax cuts raise revenues) and Starve the Beast (higher revenues lead to higher spending, anathema to conservatives), then as a good conservative, his duty is clear.  He ought to run on a truly novel platform of higher tax rates!   Why?   Higher tax rates would reduce revenues (this is what Laffer says would happen) and thereby reduce spending (this is what Starve the Beast says would happen).   
    

Seriously folks.   If McCain continues to propose extending the Bush tax cuts, he should at least be forced to choose between the Lafferite defense and the “Starve the Beast” defense. Only then can the rest of us know which of the two mutually inconsistent propositions to refute. 

I discussed my paper September 12, in a panel where Larry Summers and Gene Sperling also gave their thoughts on Supply Side Economics, at a joint meeting of the Center for American Progress  and the Economic Policy Institute.     

[Any readers wishing to comment on this blog post: I suggest you go to the RGE version.] 

In my earlier post, I catalogued some quotes from high Bush Administration officials asserting the Laffer claim that a cut in US tax rates stimulates income so much that the Treasury ends up taking in more revenue than before. I didn’t then quote in detail the extensive statements made by the Director of Office of Management and Budget, Joshua Bolten, in July 2005.

Director Bolton’s statements are of particular interest for several reasons. First, by 2005 it had become obvious to any objective observer that (1) the record budget surplus inherited by the Bush Administration had been quickly converted into a record budget deficit, and that (2) the aggressive Bush tax cuts were a major cause of that swing (as was the sharp acceleration in federal spending, both domestic and international, relative to the 1990s). Second, while the utterings of President Bush himself can in general perhaps be dismissed as not to be taken seriously, Bolten was the professional whose job is to be responsible for the integrity of the budget process. (Indeed, he is a higher-quality civil servant than some in the Bush Administration who have been quick to “bolt on” crazy ideological propositions to what should be serious positions.)

Here is what the OMB director had to say about the Laffer proposition:

“And with all those economic gains, we are also seeing more revenues coming into the Federal Treasury. We have arrived at this point largely because of this President’s and this Congress’ pro-growth policies, especially tax relief. Those policies have strengthened the economy, which is now producing better-than-expected revenues.” — Testimony of Joshua B. Bolten, Mid Session Reivioew of the President’s FY 2006 Budget Requst, Committee on the Budget, U.S. House of Representatives, page 1, para. 3.

And lots more:
“The tax cuts proposed by the President and enacted by Congress are not the [budget] problem. They are, and will be, part of the solution…Had Congress not enacted the President’s three tax relief packages, moreover, the economy would be substantially weaker than it is…The most effective way to lower future deficits is to grow the economy. And the President’s tax packages have been well designed to do precisely that.”

“…all economists, I think will agree very strongly that when you reduce taxes, put more money back into the economy, that has a feedback effect in the economy that causes growth and in turn increases receipts. And being able to measure those receipts, to see how much better the government’s fiscal situation is as a result of the tax cuts would be something I’d very much like to include in the numbers….We think we’ve done the right things by making the tax cuts to restore the economy to growth, because what got us into the difficulty deficit situation in the first place is the flagging growth, flagging receipts in the economy. We think the best way back is to restore the economy to growth, and restore receipts that correspond to it…. ”

Q: “…you’ve got a substantial drop in the deficit [forecasted] in 2005…”
A: “…there are other factors involved, and one of them is the ‘03 tax cut.”

– Press Briefing by OMB Director Josh Bolton, The White House, July 15, 2003.

Following up on my preceding post, I will here document who has said what.

High officials in the Reagan Administration apparently did subscribe to the Laffer Hypothesis:
• Reagan himself: “…our kind of tax cut will so stimulate the economy that we will actually increase government revenues…” July 7, 1981 speech 1/
• His Secretary of the Treasury, Don Regan, even after events had falsified the proposition to the satisfaction of most observers, wrote of his “very strong opinion that a tax cut would produce more revenue than a tax increase.”2/
Also: “The increase in revenues should be financed not by new and higher taxes, but by lower tax rates that would produce more money for the government by stimulating higher earnings by corporations and workers…” (p.173).

Similarly, high officials during the Bush era have also have been quoted saying that tax cuts, via faster growth, lead to higher tax revenues:
• President George W. Bush : “The best way to get more revenues in the Treasury is not raise taxes, slowing down the economy, it’s cut taxes to create more economic growth. That’s how you get more money into the U.S. Treasury.” — July 24, 2003.
• OMB Director Joshua Bolten, press conference July 2003; & WSJ, Dec. 10, 2003
• Majority Leader Tom DeLay: “We, as a matter of philosophy, understand that when you cut taxes the economy grows, and revenues to the government grow.” NYT, 3/31/04.
• Treasury Secretary John Snow, Congressional testimony, Feb. 7, 2006: “Lower tax rates are good for the economy and a growing economy is good for Treasury receipts.”
• CEA Chair Ed Lazear, press conference 2/12/07, “revenues have come in…higher than we predicted…because the economy has grown at a rate higher than we predicted…[T]he tax cuts…[were] at least in part responsible for making the economy grow.”

Most leading Republican economists who served as chief economic advisers to Presidents Reagan and Bush during their tax cutting frenzies, however, do not subscribe to the Laffer Hypothesis, and did not compromise their beliefs while in office. Three examples:

• Martin Feldstein: “I objected therefore to those supply-siders like Arthur Laffer who argued that a 30 percent across-the-board tax cut would also be self-financing because of the resulting increase in incentives to work.”3/
• Glenn Hubbard: “Although the economy grows in response to tax reductions… it is unlikely to grow so much that lost tax revenue is completely recovered by the higher level of economic activity.”4/
• Greg Mankiw: “Subsequent history failed to confirm Laffer’s conjecture that lower tax rates would raise tax revenue. When Reagan cut taxes after he was elected, the result was less tax revenue, not more.” 5/

1/ Feldstein, American Economic Policy in the 1980s (U. Chicago Press) 1994, p.21.
2/ Regan, For the Record (St. Martin’s Press: New York) 1988, (p.214).
3/ American Economic Policy in the 1980s ( U. Chicago Press) 1994, p.24 .
4/ Economic Report of the President (Government Printing Office) 2003, p.57-58.
5/ Principles of Economics (Dryden) 1998, p. 166.

I thought it would be useful to get all this into the record, since some observers have claimed that Reagan and Bush never subscribed to the Laffer hypothesis, while others have inaccurately accused Feldstein, Hubbard and Mankiw of selling out on this score.

So Arthur Laffer — still arguing the improbable “supply side” proposition that cutting income tax rates generally raises total tax revenue — is apparently now a special adviser to John McCain. And McCain has taken on a big consignment of the snake oil, to Greg Mankiw’s dismay. The political temptation for a Republican candidate to promise both lower tax rates and higher revenues is irresistible. The policy-makers who cut taxes when Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush, respectively, came to power subscribed to this claim. Remarkably, at the same time, the economists who were the chief economic advisers to Reagan and Bush during these tax cuts disavow the proposition that they increase revenue (Murray Weidenbaum, Martin Feldstein, Glenn Hubbard, Mankiw…) . Almost all serious economists – let us say Ph.D. economists – disagree with this proposition, with only a microscopic handful of exceptions like Laffer. Indeed some of the advisers who defend the Reagan and Bush economic policies claim that this formulation of supply side economics is a caricature, and was not the true rationale of the tax cuts. This wishful thinking is directly at odds with quotes from the presidents themselves and their Treasury secretaries and other economic officials, to the effect that tax cuts stimulate income so much as to produce more tax revenue. Laffer is not a straw man. (See my next post.)

Even more interesting, the academic defenders of the Republican tax cuts often offer a proposition that is diametrically opposed to the defense offered by their political masters. This is the famous “starve the beast” hypothesis: the claim that if you deprive the government of tax revenue, it will reduce government spending, which is of course viewed as a worthy objective. If this proposition were true, and the supply side hypothesis were also true, it would lead to the nonsensical proposition that Republican presidents should raise tax rates in order to reduce tax revenue (Laffer) and thereby reduce government spending (Starve the Beast). I challenge some candidate to run on that platform !

As it happens, there is abundant empirical evidence against both the Lafferite hypothesis and the Starve the Beast hypothesis. In other words, just because two propositions are diametrically opposed doesn’t mean they are not both wrong. I hope that in this election campaign, the media do something they have failed to do in the past. If McCain proposes extending the Bush tax cuts, he should at least be forced to choose between the Lafferite defense, which tends to be driven more by political expediency, and the “Starve the Beast” defense, which has more support among at least some reputable Republican economists. Only then can the rest of us know which of the two propositions to refute.