Obama’s slogan for the SOTU last night, “An Economy Built to Last,” was a way of referring to one of the accomplishments of his first years: successfully reviving the auto industry, which many had said couldn’t be done without nationalizing it.   References to other accomplishments were stated more quickly, such as national security (withdrawal from Iraq, disposing of Osama bin Laden) or more obliquely, such as health care reform, financial reform, and arresting the freefall of the economy that Obama inherited in January 2009 (via fiscal stimulus and TARP - both of which are not especially popular programs).

I realize of course that some will not view these as true “accomplishments.”  They will argue that we should have let the auto industry go bankrupt, or should have spent another 10 years in Iraq, or that bin Laden was deprived of his human rights, or that the Dodd-Frank bill went too far in financial regulation (or not far enough), or that a federal effort to reduce unnecessary hospital infections constitutes “socialism” or “death panels.”  But most Americans wanted these policies.

Evidently the President also has in mind reducing American dependence on imported oil.  And slowing the big rise in income inequality, in part by allowing to expire on schedule the tax cuts on the top earners like Mitt Romney that ten years ago brought their tax rates down to 15%.

To me, the phrase “built to last” suggests that the medium-term goal is economic growth that resembles the record expansion of the late 1990s, which was driven by expanding exports, technology, and private sector employment. This would be an improvement over the unsustainable finance-based economic expansion of the 2002-2007, or those of the 1960s, 70s or 80s;  they were built on easy monetary or fiscal policy and an expanding government sector, and thus contained the seeds of their own destruction when inflation, debts and asset prices got out of control.

Indeed, as inadequate as the current economic recovery has been, the expansion of private sector jobs over the two years has exceeded the rate during the Bush Administration (when the government sector was the primary source of what limited job creation there was).  This comparison holds even if one excludes the two recessions at the beginning and end of the 8-year Bush period, as the graph shows.

[TV clip, Post Mortem on the State of the Union Message," BNN," 2012.]

In the current issue of Foreign Policy, the editors of the FP Survey ask “top experts” for pithy solutions to the world’s economic problems, “twitter style.”  Some of the answers:

THE BIGGEST THREAT TO THE GLOBAL ECONOMY IS …
Anti-market bias. -Bryan Caplan •  Procrastination. -Peter Diamond •  Short-term thinking. -Esther Dyson •  A euro meltdown. -Dean Baker  •  Tax-cut fanatics. -Jeffrey Frankel •  The bond market. -Andy Sumner •

MY OUT-OF-THE-BOX SUGGESTION TO REVIVE THE GLOBAL ECONOMY IS
Wipe out debts. -Daron Acemoglu •  Require candidates for national office to pass ninth-grade tests on arithmetic, history, and geography. -Jeffrey Frankel •  Double down on science. -Tyler Cowen •  A government lottery where winners have mortgages, student loans, or other debt paid off. -Mark Thoma •  We don’t need “out-of-the-box” solutions; we need “head-out-of-the-sand” ones. -Adam Hersh •  Pray. -David Smick

BARACK OBAMA’S BIGGEST ECONOMIC MISTAKE HAS BEEN …
Letting Larry Summers go. -Gary Hufbauer •  Not reorganizing the big banks. —David Smick •  Trying too hard to find common ground with an opposition that won’t compromise on any terms. -Vincent Crawford •  Assuming office in January 2009. -Jeffrey Frankel

OCCUPY WALL STREET IS …
A misdirected tantrum. -Philip Levy •   A harmless pastime for unemployed youth. -Gary Hufbauer •  Reasonable complaints about crony capitalism plus self-righteous economic illiteracy. -Bryan Caplan

BY ELECTION DAY 2012, THE U.S. ECONOMY WILL BE …
Improving, but leaving many people behind. -Arnold Kling .  Limping along, with unemployment declining but still around 8 percent. -Daron Acemoglu .  Blamed for the outcome. -Jeffrey Frankel

ECONOMISTS SHOULD BE PAYING MORE ATTENTION TO …
How people actually behave rather than how they are idealized to behave. -Abhijit Banerjee •  Corporate governance. -Peter Diamond •  The fact that macroeconomic theory went up a blind alley some 20 years ago. -Jeffrey Frankel •  Creeping protectionism across the global economy. -Gary Hufbauer •   The impediments to job creation for young people. -Valerie Ramey •  Reality. -James D. Hamilton

US News and World Report asks, “Who is handling its debt crisis better: Europe or the United States?”   My answer follows.

  In both Europe and the United States, the current public debt woes are attributable to mistakes made by political leaders going back more than a decade.  In both cases the tremendous magnitude of the long-term debt problems has only become evident for all to see recently, by which time it was too late for the straightforward policy solutions that were viable options previously. 

  It is hard to judge whether it is Europe or the United States that has screwed up worse.     On the one hand, Europe is now much closer to full-fledged crisis: the debt problems in Mediterranean members are virtually insoluble at current interest rates, are probably pushing Europe back into recession, and could well result in one or more countries forced to leave the euro.  By contrast, there is no true fiscal crisis here yet; the world’s investors are still buying large quantities of US bonds at low interest rates.

  On the other hand, the mistakes by US politicians are more gratuitously self-inflicted than on the other side of the Atlantic.   In 2001, all we had to do was continue the fiscal progress that had been made during the 1990s: preserve the budget surplus and move on to address the longer term problems of social security and Medicare in a deliberate and balanced manner.  Instead we recklessly enacted massive tax cuts and tripled the rate of growth of federal spending, in ways guaranteed to generate serious fiscal troubles in the decade of the 2010s and beyond.  The debt-ceiling standoff last summer was but the latest self-inflicted wound, new evidence that the US political system is not functioning.  

  To be sure, euroland too has made serious policy mistakes.  But one can sympathize with the difficulty of agreeing policy across 17 sovereign governments.   The political fissures have been inevitable ever since 1999, when the euro members (then 11) adopted a single currency without a single fiscal authority, in what was nevertheless a historic and laudable enterprise.  As they say, “why should anyone be surprised at the difficulty of getting 17 national legislatures to agree, when the United States cannot even do it with one?”

  It is not too late for American politicians to enact the economically sensible policy:  current short-term fiscal stimulus simultaneous with steps to lock in a long-run return to fiscal responsibility (which cannot possibly be accomplished solely by discretionary spending cuts, entitlement reform, or tax revenues, but rather should include all three).   For euroland, unfortunately, even if the politicians could come together, there no longer exists an option for preserving the monetary union in quite the form originally envisioned.

** This column (along with others’ answers to the question) first appeared in the Debate Club of U.S. News & World Report , Nov. 7, 2011, which has the copyright. **

[My reactions to developments in the euro crisis can be seen in four clips from CNBC's Kudlow Report in October and one on BNN in November.] 

[This column is co-authored with Carlos Végh and Guillermo Vuletin and was published in VoxEU.]

Everywhere one looks, problems of fiscal policy are now center stage.   Among advanced countries, the news is bad:   Europe’s periphery teeters, the U.K. slashes, the U.S. deadlocks, Japan muddles.  But in the rest of the world there is better news:   In an historic reversal, many emerging market and developing countries have over the last decade achieved a countercyclical fiscal policy.

In the past, developing countries tended to follow procyclical fiscal policy:   they increased spending (or cut taxes) during periods of expansion and cut spending (or raised taxes) during periods of recession.  Many authors have documented that fiscal policy has tended to be procyclical in developing countries, in comparison with a pattern among industrialized countries that has been by and large countercyclical. (References for this proposition and others are available.)   Most studies look at the procyclicality of government spending, because tax receipts are particularly endogenous with respect to the business cycle.  Indeed, an important reason for procyclical spending is precisely that government receipts from taxes or mineral royalties rise in booms, and the government cannot resist the temptation or political pressure to increase spending proportionately, or even more than proportionately. One can find a similar pattern on the tax side by focusing on tax rates rather than revenues, though cross-country evidence is harder to come by.

Figure I (which is a version of evidence presented in Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh, 2004) depicts the correlation between government spending and GDP for 94 countries over the period 1960-1999.   More precisely, it shows the correlation between the cyclical components of spending and GDP;  the longer term trends are taken out.   The set includes 21 developed countries, which are represented by black bars, and 73 developing countries, represented by yellow bars.  A positive correlation indicates government spending that is procyclical, that is, destabilizing.  A negative correlation indicates countercyclical spending, that is, stabilizing.  

[Click here for enlargement of Figure I.] 

There is no missing the message.  Yellow bars lie overwhelmingly on the right hand side:  more than 90 percent of developing countries show positive correlations (procyclical spending).  Black bars dominate the left hand side:  around 80 per cent of industrial countries show negative correlations (countercyclical spending).

 Over the last decade there has been a historic shift in the cyclical behavior of fiscal policy in the developing world.     Figure II updates the statistics, showing the period 2000-2009.  The number of yellow bars on the left side of the graph (negative correlations) has greatly increased.   Around 35 percent of developing countries [26 out of 73] now show a countercyclical fiscal policy, more than quadruple the share during the earlier period.  

[Click here for enlargement of Figure II.] 

Figure III presents a scatter plot with the 1960-1999 correlation on the horizontal axis and the 2000-2009 correlation on the vertical axis.  The lower right quadrant shows the graduates from procyclical to countercyclical fiscal policy.  The star performers include Chile and Botswana; but 24 developing countries altogether (out of 73) have made this historic shift.  

[Click here for enlargement of Figure III.] 

The evidence of countercyclicality among many emerging market and developing countries matches up with other criteria for judging maturity in the conduct of fiscal policy:    debt/GDP ratios, rankings by rating agencies, and sovereign spreads.  Low income and emerging market countries in the aggregate have achieved debt/GDP levels around 40 percent of GDP over the last four years.  [The IMF estimates the 2011 ratio at 43 per cent among emerging market countries and 35 per cent among low-income countries]. This is the same period during which debt in advanced countries has risen from about 70 per cent of GDP to 102 percent.   The financial markets have ratified the historic turnaround.   Spreads are now lower for many emerging markets than for some “advanced countries.”    Rating agencies rank Singapore as more creditworthy than Belgium, Korea ahead of Portugal, Mexico ahead of Iceland, and just about everybody ahead of Greece.    Euromoney ranks Chile as less risky than Japan, Korea less risky than Italy, Malaysia less risky than Spain, and Brazil less risky than Portugal.

Largely as a result of their improved fiscal situations during the period 2000-2007, many emerging markets were able to bounce back from the 2008-2009 global financial crisis more quickly than advanced countries.   

What explains the ability of some countries, particularly emerging market and developing countries, to escape the trap of procyclical fiscal policy? Many researchers have pointed to the importance of institutions.  In new research we find that the cyclicality of a country’s fiscal policy is inversely correlated with the country’s institutional quality (which includes measures of law and order, bureaucracy quality, corruption, and other risks to investment).    The relationship holds also when instrumental variables are used.

Although one thinks of institutions as slow-moving, they can change over time.   Chile’s institutional quality has risen strongly since the early 1980s, during which time its fiscal policy has turned from procyclical to countercyclical.   A country with good institutional quality in the general sense of rule of law can help lock in countercyclical fiscal policy through specific budget institutions.   Chile did it with the structural budget reforms of 2000 and 2006.   Chile’s approach could be emulated by others.

Fiscal rules, such as euroland’s  Stability and Growth Pact, may accomplish little in themselves.   Rules can actually worsen the tendency of governments to make overly optimistic forecasts for economic growth and budget balance.   Chile’s key innovation was to give responsibility for forecasting to independent expert commissions, insulated from politicians’ wishful thinking.

Even advanced countries have something to learn about countercyclical fiscal policy from Chile and others to the South.  Saving during expansions such as 2001-06 is critical for weathering the storm in recessions such as 2008-09.  Otherwise there may be no way out but to adjust at the worst possible time.

Korea may have an opportunity to exercise historic leadership, when it chairs the G-20 meeting in Seoul, November 11-12.    This will be the first time that a non-G-7 country has hosted the G-20 since the larger, more inclusive, group supplanted the smaller rich-country group in April of last year as the premier steering committee for the world economy.  With large emerging market and developing countries playing such expanded economic roles, the G-7 had lost legitimacy.  It was high time to make the membership more representative.    But there is also a danger that the G-20 will now prove too unwieldy, in which case decision-making might then revert to the smaller group.

When countries like China and India used to demand a larger voice in world governance based on their large populations, they did not get very far.   Substantive power in multilateral governance is allocated according to the Golden Rule: “He who has the gold rules.”    But after a few decades of miraculous economic growth rates they now have the economic heft.    China is now larger economically than Japan or Germany.   Brazil is also one of the seven largest economies.

Beyond GDP, we have recently seen a historic role reversal, in which debtor-creditor patterns have changed.    Many developing countries, breaking historic patterns, took advantage of the global boom of 2003-2007 to achieve high national saving rates, particularly in the form of strong government budgets, while the advanced countries did not.   As a result, the debt levels of the top 20 rich countries (debt/GDP ratios around 80%) are now twice those of the top 20 emerging markets.   And it is rising rapidly.   A number of emerging market countries now have higher credit ratings than a number of so-called advanced countries.  A stronger fiscal position is one of the reasons that countries like China could afford to undertake large and sustained fiscal stimulus in response to the 2008-09 global recession.   The United States and United Kingdom, by contrast, had wasted the preceding expansion running budget deficits, and hence by 2010 had come to feel heavily constrained by their debts.

It is understandable if Korea views its hosting of the G-20 as another opportunity for marking its arrival on the world stage (as when it hosted the Olympics) or for consolidating its status as an industrialized economy (as when it joined the OECD).  But it should make more of its opportunity than this.  Korea should seize the chance to exercise substantive leadership.   Otherwise, the risk is that its period in the chair could appear like a replay of the chaotic Czech presidency of the EU in the first half of 2009, which confirmed the feelings of some in the larger European countries that it was a mistake to let smaller countries take their turns behind the wheel.

Korea can serve as a bridge between the G-7 and the developing countries.  But chairing a successful meeting will be a challenge, with respect to both meeting management and substantive issues.

With regard to managing the meeting, the challenge comes from the size of the group.   There is always a tradeoff between legitimacy and workability.   The G-7 was small enough to be workable but too small to claim legitimacy.  The United Nations is big enough to claim legitimacy but too big to be workable.  The latest evidence of this was the Conference of Parties of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change in Copenhagen last December.  The UNFCCC proved a totally ineffectual vehicle, in part because small countries repeatedly blocked progress.    President Obama was able to make more progress by spending a few minutes in a room with a few big emitting countries than the delegates had achieved in two weeks.

The G-20 has enough legitimacy for its purpose — which is more limited than the purposes of formal institutions such as the UN, IMF, and WTO.  It accounts for 85% of the world’s GDP, for example.    But it is too big to be workable as a steering group.  A principle of multilateral talk-shops is that conversation is not possible with more than 10 in the room.  With 20 delegations, each reads prepared statements;  there is no give and take and the communiqué is a watered down least-common-denominator press release.   Not only does the G-20 have more than 10 delegations; it actually has more than 20.

The G-20 needs a smaller informal steering group within the steering group, a G-6 or G-9 within the G-20.   It could meet in the evening before the main G-20 meeting and discuss how to organize the discussion in the larger group.

Who would be in the G-6 or G-9?   It would be unwise to be too specific at this point.  Nevertheless, the US, Japan, and Europe (represented perhaps by the EU Commission), must be there on the rich-country side; China, India, and Brazil must be there on the developing-country side.   Of course the pressure to expand is always irresistible.  Europe could be represented by both the U.K. and euroland.    In Seoul, Korea has to be there as the host. Who would be the 9^th country in the G-9?   It should be the country of which the person reading this blog post is a citizen.

What about the substance of the meetings?   The group will discuss whatever the bigger countries consider it most useful to discuss at the time.    Five possible topics include:

• At long last, giving more seats on the IMF executive board to big emerging market countries, in proportion to their rising economic clout,offset by consolidation of some of Europe’s seats.
• More financial regulatory reform, such as coordination of any small taxes or penalties that members want to apply to risk-taking banks.
• Global current account imbalances. Perhaps there will be a statement agreeing that large current account deficits or surpluses tend to lead to problem (absent some good economic justification), that exchange rates and budget deficits both bear some responsibility for current large imbalances, and that the burden of adjustment should be born by neither one alone, but rather by both.
• Macroeconomic exit strategies. I personally would favor an articulation of the proposition that concrete steps toward long-term fiscal consolidation in each country need not require premature withdrawal of current fiscal stimulus. An example would be to raise the future retirement age or take other steps today to reform public pensions, even while simultaneously enacting some short-term stimulus in the US and UK.
• Moving toward a new agreement on climate change to take the place of the Kyoto Protocol after 2012. Korea is in a good position to lead, as essentially the first post-Kyoto country to accept emission targets.

Don’t judge the outcome of the meeting by what appears in the media.   Press reviews usually pronounce such summits a let-down.   But occasionally such meetings are important, in ways that are often not clear until later.

Consider the London G-20 meeting of April 2009.    It was not obvious at the time that it had been a success in terms of substantive policies.   Observers even compared it to the infamous failed London Economic Summit of 1933, which was a way of saying that the world had not learned the lessons of the Great Depression.    But the 2009 meeting appears far better in hindsight.  Looking back on 2009, fiscal stimulus turned out to be more widespread in 2009 than one might have guessed.    Similarly, global monetary policy was easy, avoiding another big mistake of the 1930s.  The G-20 unexpectedly agreed to triple IMF resources and bring the SDR back from the dead.  Even in the area of trade policy, despite fears of protectionism, the outcome was not bad at all by the standards of past recessions, let alone in comparison with the Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1930.   Overall, policy-makers’ immediate response to the global recession in 2009 did not repeat the mistakes of the early 1930s.

Currently, however, the advanced countries are in danger of repeating the mistake that President Franklin Roosevelt made in 1937, when he cut spending prematurely and sent the US economy back into recession.  Perhaps the G-20 will be a venue in which the big emerging market countries can remind the U.S. and the U.K. of the lesson they once knew but have now forgotten — what it means to run a countercyclical fiscal policy.

[This column was written for Project Syndicate. Comments can be posted there.]

During much of the last decade, U.S. fiscal policy has been procyclical, that is, destabilizing.   We wasted the opportunity of the 2003-07 expansion by running large budget deficits.   As a result, in 2010, Washington now feels constrained by inherited debts to withdraw fiscal stimulus at a time when unemployment is still high.   Fiscal policy in the UK and other European countries has been even more destabilizing over the last decade.  Governments decide to expand when the economy is strong and then contract when it is weak, thereby exacerbating the business cycle.    

Meanwhile, some emerging market and developing countries have learned how to run countercyclical fiscal policy - saving in the boom and easing in the recession - during the same decade that we advanced countries have forgotten how to.    

The frenetic debate at any moment for or against “fiscal conservatism” is artificial.  It is not the right answer always to shrink any more than it is the right answer always to expand.  Americans should take a perspective longer than the annual budget cycle or the bi-annual electoral cycle, let alone the daily news cycle.   When the United States was able to take advantage of the long 1992-2000 boom to eliminate its budget deficit, the key legislation had been enacted in 1990 and 1993.   Similarly, the big deficits of the last ten years were created by the legislation of 2001 and 2003.   Bringing back far-sighted fiscal policy would mean taking steps today to lock in long-term progress toward fiscal responsibility (such as enacting social security reform) but at the same time extending last year’s short-term fiscal stimulus so long as the economy is still weak.

It might help to have ways to insulate fiscal policy from some of the wilder vagaries of politics.    I came away from a conference in Chile recently, impressed anew by that country’s accomplishments.  It has achieved countercyclical fiscal policy over the last ten years by means of some innovative institutions.   Chile has a rule that targets the structural budget balance.  In other words, it can only run a deficit to the extent that GDP and the price of copper are below their long-run trends.  But a structural budget rule is not enough in itself.   Who is to say which deficits are structural and which are temporary?  Chile’s key innovation ten years ago was to vest responsibility for determining the long-run trends in GDP and copper prices in two panels of independent experts.   Why does this matter?   One reason that politicians spend too much in booms is that they convince themselves that deficits are temporary even when they are really structural.  Officials in the US and Europe made overly-optimistic forecasts of future growth rates and tax revenues during the 2001-07 expansion.  Research shows that this is a systematic pattern.  The biased forecasts contributed to unaffordable tax cuts and accelerated spending, which in turn spelled excessive deficits and debts.  Today we are living with the consequences of this procyclicality.

Perhaps we should look South, in order to re-learn how to run countercyclical budgets. 

[For comments, go to SeekingAlpha.]

              The NBER’s Business Cycle Dating Committee, of which I am a member, announced this morning that June 2009 was the trough of the recession that began in December 2007.    It was the longest recession since the 1930s.

              It is the fate of the Committee to be teased mercilessly every time we make one of our formal declarations of a turning point in the economy.   We get it from both directions:    We waited too late to call the end of the recession, or we did it too early.     (Occasionally someone makes both criticisms simultaneously!)   Even The Daily Show got in on the fun this time.

              On the one hand, people say “Who needs the NBER to tell us what we already knew?”    It is true that GDP has been expanding for 5 quarters now, and that most economists have therefore considered the recession over for some time.   But it is not that easy to call the precise trough, for several reasons:  different indicators say different things regarding the precise date of the bottom, data get revised, and we could not have been confident until now that a hypothetical new downturn would count as a second recession instead of a continuation of the first one.    Does the 15-month lag in this announcement seem like a long time?  It took us 18 months to declare the end of the preceding recession (2001).

              On the other hand, people say “It doesn’t feel like the recession is over to me or to people I know.  How can the NBER be so out of touch?”   The main answer, here:  The proposition that the recession is over is only a statement that things are no longer getting worse; it is not a statement that we are back to good times.    The economy still feels bad for good reason:  it is bad.  In particular the unemployment rate is still very high.   But things are much better now than they were 18 months ago, when the economy was in freefall, or in mid-2009, when we were at the bottom of the worst downturn since the Great Depression.  It takes a long time to emerge fully from a hole that deep.  And, to be sure, the current pace of the expansion is disappointingly slow, especially with respect to jobs.  But GDP and employment are, at least, rising.

              The other question that we are asked the most is whether one should worry about a double dip recession.  The NBER does not forecast.  I can speak only for myself.    The possibility of a new downturn is indeed a concern, especially because Washington has been unable to deliver a sensible fiscal response. (A sensible policy in my view would consist of some more stimulus, as in February 2009, designed to maximize bang-for-the-buck, coupled with simultaneous steps to move the long-term fiscal path back toward responsibility, such as social security reform).    But even without an appropriate fiscal response, I am optimistic that we can avoid sliding back into a second outright recession.  More likely, we will have a slow continuation of the current (inadequate) recovery.

President Obama proposes allowing the Bush tax cuts to expire next year — as they are scheduled to do if nothing is changed — for those earning more than $250,000, but changing the law so as to extend the tax cuts for those earning less than that amount.   Republican politicians are opposing the proposal.    I don’t understand what they are thinking.  Their position doesn’t make sense to me, regardless whether they are thinking about short-term stimulus, long-term fiscal conservatism, good economics, or even pure politics.   

Start with the pure politics.   What is the end-game?   Are congressional Republicans prepared to block the Obama proposal extending the tax cuts for those making less than $250,000 and to let them expire as in the original legislation proposed by President Bush and passed by the Congress in 2001-03?   More than 95 % of Americans make less than $250,000.   Their taxes will go up on January 1 as a direct result if Republicans block the Obama proposal.  How are they going to explain their position to the voters when the current law takes effect?    Will it be: “To address budget deficits we need to let taxes go up on most Americans”?   That doesn’t sound like them.   Or: “Minimizing taxes for the rich is so important that we are willing to let taxes go up on everyone else”?     When it comes down to the wire, surely they would have to back down.  So why aren’t they thinking ahead?  

The same goes for the estate tax, which under the original Bush legislation is scheduled in January 2011 to bounce back from oblivion (beneficiaries of any rich people who die in 2010 don’t have to pay a dime of tax) to the old system of taxing estates worth over a million dollars at 45%.  The White House proposal is to exempt in future years all estates under $ 3 ½ million, $7 million for couples, and to tax only the largest estates.  If the Republicans are going to continue to oppose Obama, how are they going to explain this to the electorate?   That the only benefits that matter are those for the tiny minority of super-rich?

Now let’s move to economics.  If you were going after stimulus because the recovery is still weak, and if you believed that only tax cuts created stimulus, the priority should be in other areas like extending the Making Work Pay provisions for low-income workers, which are also set to expire.   This proposition holds regardless whether
(i) your idea of stimulus is Keynesian demand expansion (the lower-income workers have a higher marginal propensity to consume), OR even if
(ii) your idea of stimulus is purely enhanced incentives to work.  (Lower income workers face overall effective marginal tax rates that are often higher than the rich face, when one factors in payroll taxes, etc.)    Alec Phillips of GS US Global ECS Research points out that the amount of revenue (and stimulus) that is at stake in the expiration of Making Work Pay is greater than in the expiration of tax cuts for those over $250,000, and yet the latter question is getting all the attention and the former question is getting no attention.

Fixing the Alternative Minimum Tax is another sensible policy that qualifies as a tax cut relative to existing legislation, and should be part of any fiscal package.

If we want to achieve short-term fiscal stimulus from the viewpoint of good economics, then we should realize that well-chosen spending programs give far more bang-for-the-buck than most tax cuts.   (”Bang for the buck” means a high ratio of short-term fiscal stimulus to long-term damage to the national debt.  It’s the opposite of how the Bush fiscal program was designed in 2001-03.)    Examples of well-chosen spending programs include aid to the states (which Republican congressmen have been voting down) so that the hard-pressed states don’t have to lay off firemen, policemen, bus drivers, teachers and road workers.     Examples of tax cuts with much less bang for the buck include not just those for the rich (e.g., the abolition of the estate tax), but even garden-variety income tax cuts, because they are partly saved.    Don’t take my word for it.   Martin Feldstein (whose work on taxes and incentives led to the supply side revolution, and who was the Chairman of Reagan’s Council of Economic Advisers) argues that almost all of the income tax cut that was passed n response to the recession in 2008 was saved by households rather than spent, and predictably so, and that government spending would bring more short-term stimulus.

Of course good economics would mean not just short-term fiscal stimulus, but equal emphasis on measures to bring the budget deficit under control in the long run.   The best proposals are the least popular, as so often.   Fixing social security would be a huge step toward long-term fiscal responsibility, without endangering the current recovery.   A good package would combine all these measures. 

The current economic question is what to do about budget deficits.   The Greek crisis has made sovereign debt a genuine concern even among advanced countries.  (I should say “especially among advanced countries,” because developing countries now have stronger fiscal positions, in a historic reversal of roles.)   At this weekend’s G-20 Summit, Germany and the UK are defending strong fiscal austerity, with language that doesn’t even allow for the idea that short-term spending might be expansionary under severe recessionary conditions such as 2008-09.   In the US, Peter Orszag is reported this week to have resigned as OMB Director, not just to get married, but supposedly in part out of frustration about the fiscal outlook and President Obama’s refusal, as part of any comprehensive deficit correction program, to reverse his campaign pledge against raising taxes on those earning less than $250,000.

American economists have no shortage of ideas for cutting the US budget deficit in the long run, in economically efficient ways.   (Among other steps: limit tax expenditures.)   There are two big obstacles.  (more…)

The NBER Business Cycle Dating Committee this morning posted an announcement that it had met in person April 8 - an infrequent event - but that it had not yet decided to call the trough in the recession that began in December 2007.    The meeting has led to lots of questions from the press over the weekend, for stories that appeared today, and then more questions today in response to those stories.  Here are some of the questions that have come up the most often, and my own personal answers, speaking for myself and not the Committee of which I am a member. (more…)