The National Tax Journal asks for views on a recent proposal from Len Burman to limit tax expenditures.   My answer:   I couldn’t agree more.

With regard to the politics, one would have to see whether the phrase “cut tax expenditures” polls more like the phrase “cut expenditures,” which I assume polls well, or like the phrase “raise taxes,” which of course polls horribly.  I have no idea.  But at least there is a hope of breaking through the mindless artificial “Taxes versus Spending” rhetoric that dominates Washington.

With regard to the merits of the idea as economic policy — in a context where strong measures to reduce the budget deficit will be necessary in coming years — Burman is completely right.   Most tax expenditures tend by nature to be distortionary.   Many of them are convoluted ways of making what would otherwise be a subsidy look like a tax deduction.

Agreeing to the general principle of limiting tax expenditures is easier than agreeing to all the detailed implications.   Looking at the list of the actual 12 largest tax expenditures would give most people pause.   But much less so for economists.    The only one on the list that gives me serious pause, personally, is #7:  the “charitable deduction (other than education and health).”   But the top two deserve to be cut, as part of a larger fiscal package, not just because they would save a lot of money, but also to get economic incentives right.  Those top two are the exclusion for employer-sponsored health insurance and the mortgage interest deduction.

A proposal to eliminate the mortgage interest deduction would of course get zero support in Congress, because it is political suicide with middle class voters.   A more moderate proposal to freeze the amount of the deduction would also be unpopular.  The same with four other pro-housing tax expenditures out of Len’s list of 12:    deduction for property taxes, exclusion of net imputed rental income, capital gains exclusion on home sales, and property tax deduction.   All politicians and voters (excluding economists) continue to believe that public policy should tilt in favor of home ownership.   Notwithstanding the recession that began with the sub-prime mortgage crisis of 2007, economists have not made even a dent in popular perceptions, with our arguments against artificially tilting the field away from rental housing and the rest of the capital stock, which is what you do when you tilt toward owner-occupied housing.   That the bias is toward high leverage in home ownership makes it worse.  To take another example, whatever happens ultimately to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, they certainly won’t be abolished.    Americans believe too strongly in the dream of home ownership to absorb fully the point that you are not doing a family a favor if getting them into their own house means burdening them with debt that they will probably not be able to repay.

“Political impossibility” is not a reason not to try.  After all, our country will not get through the next few decades, fiscally, unless we make some “politically impossible” changes.   But I emphasized the housing issue in the preceding paragraph to make a different point.   Almost all commentators on the financial crisis, whether from the left or right, talk as if the causes of the crisis are obvious and our leaders are idiots for not having acted to fix the problem ahead of time.  Needless to say, those on the left blame the right, for deregulation, and those on the right blame the left, for moral hazard.   And yet there is still zero support for fixing the housing policy parts of the problem, on which economists have almost unanimous agreement (and did ahead of the crisis).

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“Should Central Banks Target Asset Prices?”   That is the question addressed by the current symposium in The International Economy (2009, no.4).

My answer: 

Alan Greenspan was right to raise the question “How do we know when ‘irrational exuberance’ has unduly escalated stock prices?”, which is what he actually said in 1996.    But he was wrong to conclude subsequently that monetary policy should ignore asset prices (or even that it should take asset prices into account only to the extent that they contain information about future inflation, as the Inflation Targeters would have it).    More specifically,
(1) Identifying in real time that we were in a stock market bubble by 2000 and a real estate bubble by 2006 was not in fact harder than the Fed’s usual job, forecasting inflation 18 months ahead;
(2) Central bankers do have tools that can often prick bubbles; and
(3) The “Greenspan put” policy of mopping up the damage only after run-ups abruptly end probably contributed to the magnitude of the bubbles ex ante, while yet being insufficient ex post to prevent the crisis from becoming the worst recession since the 1930s.    All three points run contrary to what was conventional wisdom among monetary economists and central bankers a mere two years ago.

As Claudio Borio and Bill White at the BIS pointed out before the financial crisis, many of the worst economic collapses of the last 100 years have occurred after excessively easy monetary policy had shown up in asset prices but not in inflation: US 1929, Japan1990, East Asia 1997, and now the US 2007.

A final point: “Targeting asset prices” is the wrong phrase.  The word “target” (for example, with respect to the money supply, exchange rate, or inflation) implies a number, or at least a numerical range.   I don’t know anyone who thinks that the central bank should contemplate setting a numerical range for the stock market.   Rather, the claim, which I think the evidence now supports, is that central bankers would be well advised to monitor prices of equities and real estate and to speak out, and eventually to act, on those rare occasions when asset prices get very far out of line.

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My response:

I do think that measures such as the Contingent Convertible Bonds would be a useful step.  Some argue that it would be hard to know when to invoke the contingency clause.  It strikes me that this argument largely vanishes when one realizes that the clause would of necessity be invoked by the time we got to the stage of a Bear Stearns or Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. CoCos would not go very far in themselves toward comprehensive reform of the financial system, if that is the goal.  But then no single policy measure would do that.  I agree with Gillian Tett: “In theory, I think that CoCos certainly could be a useful additional to banks’ tool kits. However, in practice, the contagion risk suggests it would be dangerous to rely too heavily on an exclusive diet of CoCos for any policy ‘fix’.” 

Two related issues are of much bigger import.   First, is it a feasible goal to eliminate, credibly, the problem “too big to fail” or “too interconnected to fail,” thereby eliminating the critical moral hazard problem?  My suspicion is that this is not an achievable goal, when push comes to shove, ex post, in a crisis; and if I am right, then it is very important that we don’t return to the rhetoric of claiming “no bank is automatically too big to fail” and so fail to regulate and collect insurance from the banks ex ante.   This would just exacerbate the moral hazard problem.   Commercial banks are like river banks  in this respect.

Second, would the legislation that is offered by Senator Chris Dodd be a better approach to financial reform than alternative proposals, or even than the status quo?     While the 1,000+ page Dodd bill undoubtedly has some good things in it (the principle of a Consumer Protection Agency in lending is probably at the top of the list), I believe it would be very damaging overall. The major reason is that it would seriously undermine the power of the Fed to set fully-informed monetary policy in normal times and to respond effectively in times of crisis.  It seems that Barney Frank understands these things much better. 

The field of International Monetary Economics is not without its own cycles and fads.

In a speech at the European Central Bank over the summer, “On Global Currencies,” I identified eight concepts that I saw as having recently “peaked” and eight more that I saw as newly rising in relevance. Those that I viewed as losing traction were: the G-7, global savings glut, corners hypothesis, proliferating currency unions, inflation targeting (narrowly defined), exorbitant privilege, Bretton Woods II, and currency manipulation. Those that I saw as receiving increased emphasis now and in the future were: the G-20, the IMF, SDR, credit cycle, reserves, intermediate exchange rate regimes, commodity currencies, and multiple international currency system.

A condensed version appears this month in Finance and Development, from the IMF, titled “What’s ‘In’ and What’s ‘Out’ in Global Money.”  I boil the list down to five concepts that I pronounce “on the way out” and five more that I see as replacing them:

• The G-7 has been rendered largely obsolete by its lack of representation of developing countries, and thus in the course of 2009 has been overtaken by the G-20.

• The corners hypothesis had become conventional wisdom by the end of the 1990s. This was the idea that all countries were or should be abandoning intermediate exchange rate regimes (bands, baskets, crawling pegs, adjustable pegs, and heavily managed floats) in favor of either the floating corner or the institutionally fixed corner (currency boards, dollarization, or monetary union). Since 2001 the tide has turned against the corners hypothesis, and far fewer economists would now assert it as a sweeping generalization.  Certainly a huge fraction of the members of the IMF continue to follow intermediate regimes.

• The language of “unfair currency manipulation,” has been in US law since 1988 and the IMF Articles of Agreement for longer. China during the years 2004-2008 was pretty much the first large country to face charges of unfairly manipulating its currency to keep it undervalued. But US Congressmen who have for years urged China to abandon its link to the dollar could well live to regret it, if they were to get their way and the People’s Bank of China did in fact stop buying US treasury bills. It is finally beginning to sink in among Americans that having China as its largest creditor carries with it some new constraints.  What concept is “on its way in,” to replace the idea that intervening to prevent one’s currency from appreciating is anathema?   Reserves.  Two short years ago, Western economists were lecturing surplus countries that they were acquiring too many reserves.  Today we see that the developing countries that have weathered the 2007-09 crisis the best are countries that had previously piled up the most reserves, other things equal.

• Most controversially, I assert that Inflation Targeting — narrowly defined, I hasten to add — has seen its best days. The definition of IT I have in mind is the proposition that the monetary authorities should set a target range for the increase in the CPI each year, and then should focus all their efforts on hitting it. This orthodoxy says that the central bankers should pay no attention to asset prices, the exchange rate, or commodity prices, except to the extent that they carry implications for the CPI. For large rich countries, it has become clear since 2007 that Alan Greenspan was wrong when he (plausibly) abjured all attempts to identify or discourage bubbles in real estate and stock markets. As a result, the credit cycle view of monetary policy has been resurrected , after a long period when only inflation was thought to matter. For smaller and developing countries, I would also argue that volatility in commodity prices has made it clear that monetary policy should let currencies depreciate, at least somewhat, when the terms of trade worsen, rather than the opposite as is implied by a strict interpretation of CPI targeting. For them, I would propose replacing the CPI target with a more production-oriented price index, such as a target for the PPI or even an export price index.

• The United States has benefited throughout the post-war period by an unlimited ability to borrow in dollars. A popular view two years ago, supported by some of the best scholars, was that the US had earned the dollar privilege by establishing a unique comparative advantage in supplying a saving-glut world with high-quality assets. Then the sub-prime mortgage crisis in 2007 revealed that US assets were not so high-quality after all. The dollar did retain the benefit of being the safe haven currency in 2008, as an exorbitant privilege — contrary to the predictions of those of us who had predicted that the unsustainable current account deficit would lead to a large depreciation. Nevertheless, some developments in the course of 2009 have suggested a global movement away from the unipolar dollar standard, and toward a new multiple international reserve system. These events include the gradual rise of the euro as an international currency to rival the dollar, the sudden and unexpected resurrection of the SDR from near-death, new interest in the yen and gold as safe haven assets (including among central banks), and the very first glimmerings of an international role for the RMB.

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The Queen of England during the summer asked economists why no one had predicted the credit crunch and recession.   Paul Krugman points out that, inasmuch as economists can almost never predict the timing of recessions (and don’t claim to be able to), the real questions are worse.  The real questions are, rather how macroeconomists (most) could have gotten it so wrong as to believe that:
(i) a severe recession was not even looming ahead as a potential danger, and
(ii) a breakdown of many of the world’s most liquid financial markets, in New York and London, was impossible to imagine.

To anyone wondering about these questions, I recommend Krugman’s essay in the New York Times Sunday magazine, September 6:  “How Did Economists Get it So Wrong?” .
I think his diagnosis of the state of macroeconomic theory for the last 30 years has it right. 

I would only add that he is modest in skipping over one point:  during Japan’s lost decade of growth in the 1990s Paul himself forcefully drew from the Japanese experience the implication that a severe economic breakdown was, after all, possible in a modern industrialized economy – a breakdown that both was reminiscent of the Great Depression and was outside the ken of modern macroeconomic theory.   But macroeconomics went on as before.   (Likewise with the stock market correction of 1987, the LTCM crisis of 1998, and the dotcom bust of 2000-01.   I do think, however, that our field did a better job with the emerging market crises of 1994-2001, in part because it was considered permissible to argue that financial markets in this case were highly imperfect.)

The list of scholarly economists who in my view deserve kudos for getting important parts of the crisis right ahead of time also includes, among others:

• Robert Shiller – for declaring most visibly that the housing boom was a bubble,
• Ned Gramlich — for pointing out most assiduously that families were being persuaded to take out mortgages that weren’t good for them,
• Ragu Rajan — for diagnosing most accurately the problems of excessive leverage in the financial system,
• Claudio Borio and Bill White at the BIS — for seeing most presciently the dangers of a monetary policy that ignored asset bubbles, and
• Nouriel Roubini – for warning most fortissimo how serious a future meltdown was likely to be.

Returning to Krugman’s NYT article, even the caricature drawings are good…  except that I have never seen Olivier Blanchard in a double-breasted suit.    But Robert Lucas definitely merits a place there as a leader of the orthodoxy:   When given one page in a recent  Economist essay to defend “freshwater” economic theorists regarding the crisis, he actually thought it was a useful rebuttal to point out that critics are repeating arguments they have made before.  And he also thought it was useful to explain:  “The term “efficient” as used here means that individuals use information in their own private interest. It has nothing to do with socially desirable pricing; people often confuse the two.”  — As if it is not the latter question that the public is wondering about.

(For other economists’ reactions to the Krugman piece, see the National Journal site.)

 [Any reader wishing to make comments on this post is referred to the RGE version.]

A year ago, it occurred to me that if the popular blood lust against the financial sector was to be given vent, one could do worse than adopt a small (but global) tax on financial transactions.    On August 27 it was reported that Adair Turner, head of the UK Financial Services Authority, had come out in support of just such an idea, arguing that the financial sector is too large.   The Financial Times editorializes against the proposal, pointing out the importance of the sector to Britain, and arguing that ”bonus-bashing is a distraction.”  Willem Buiter is with Turner in believing that the financial sector is too large, but views the transactions tax as the wrong policy tool for the job.

It is worth recalling that more of the original goals of the bailout packages of a year ago have been attained than most commentators expected.    First, the goal of preventing a depression in the general economy has apparently been accomplished — and without nationalization of the large banks.    The Administration and the Fed always said that helping some undeserving financiers would be an undesirable but necessary side effect of the rescue plan   You don’t punish someone who has been smoking in bed by allowing the resultant fire to burn down the block.   Second, the goal of recouping a substantial share of the bailout costs has also begun to be realized – contrary to many cynical predictions – as banks repay loans to the Treasury and to the Federal Reserve, often at a profit to the taxpayer.

Nevertheless, it is indeed irksome that the banks have continued to pay out huge bonuses to their top employees, and to oppose the creation of a new US agency for financial consumer protection.   So the public’s anger is understandable.   Perhaps the transactions tax is indeed the right way to go.  Our Treasury and others’ could really use the revenue, especially if they don’t recover full value on the money that has been put into rescuing financial institutions.  Furthermore, the idea of shrinking the volume of transactions in financial markets nowadays looks much less likely to damage economic efficiency than we once believed.    

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Friday marks 200 days in office for President Obama.   “How has he done?” asks Fortune.

The first thing to say is that Barack Obama took over the presidency at an extremely difficult time. A variety of analogies suggest themselves: He is Harry Houdini who has been thrown in the river, in a straitjacket, with chains wrapped around him. Or he has taken over as the captain of a ship with a rotting hull, while the ship is under attack in a hurricane. To capture the state of the economy, perhaps the best metaphor is that Obama took over as pilot of an airplane in the middle of a steep dive. For a president precedent, he is Lincoln, who takes office as the South secedes. Or he is Roosevelt, who takes office at the depth of the Great Depression.

In any case, in light of the difficult circumstances, I think Obama has done amazingly well.

The financial markets were in free-fall six months ago. Bank spreads were at historic highs (a good indicator of just how outside-the-box this financial crisis was). GDP contracted at an annual rate of about 6 % in the last quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of this year.

Since then, the airplane has begun to level off. Those bank spreads are down to more normal levels. GDP declined at an annual rate of “only” 1% according to last Friday’s advance estimate; if I had to guess, we will see a bottom in the second half of the year and could see some positive growth. I give a lot of credit to the fiscal stimulus, to the monetary stimulus, and to the financial repair measures, as messy as those inevitably were.

At the time our new president took office in January, there was a danger that this could be not only the worst of the post-war recessions, but as bad as Japan in the 1990s. I think we have now avoided that. We have learned from mistakes in the past, particularly the mistakes of the Depression – those made by the Federal Reserve, Hoover, and also Roosevelt. Obama has the advantage of the lessons of the 1930s to learn from.   But he has the disadvantage of having inherited an exploding path of debt (unnecessarily incurred by this predecessor).    The debt is the rotting hull of the ship of state.

Regarding February’s stimulus package, some commentators said it was too small, some said it was too large.  In truth, it was both.   It was too small by itself to return us to full employment, to knock out the recession.   In order to bring us back to full employment, we would  need a boost to spending several times as big.  And yet, at the same time, it was too large to guarantee that we avoid losing the confidence of our international creditors.   If they stop buying our bonds, US long-term interest rates could rise sharply.   (China — the largest holder of US Treasuiy securities — has already begun to ask questions about the value of US debt.)     But the Administration struck an appropriate balance between these two competing concerns. 

People are angry about the big bonuses that are still being paid to those in the financial sector who got us into this problem. Entirely understandable. But don’t forget that, from the beginning, the goal was to prevent a depression in the general economy. That has been accomplished. You don’t punish someone who has been smoking in bed by allowing the resultant fire to burn down the block. The Administration and the Fed always admitted freely that helping some undeserving financiers would be an undesirable but necessary side effect of the rescue plan. And do you remember all the pundits who warned that the rescue could not work unless the banks were temporarily nationalized? Or all the cynics who dismissed claims that the Treasury would recoup a share of the budget costs as firms like Goldman Sachs repaid their loans with interest?

In my view, overall, Obama has gotten far more things right than wrong. He has bravely proposed things that most sensible economists — whether Republican or Democrat — have long favored. Proposing is not always the same as enacting; there is the matter of Congress. But he has tried to get them passed, and has tried to do it in a bipartisan way.  (That bipartisanship constraint is one of the Houdini chains.)

Washington has always been stymied by the political constraints of what can pass Congress.  Often presidents figure that special interest groups will block sensible reforms, so why waste political capital trying? But an example, which I find extremely encouraging, including symbolically, is that (with the help of Defense Secretary Robert Gates), Obama proposed to end spending on the F22 fighter. The F22 is probably the most egregious example in the defense budget of spending on hugely expensive weapons systems that the Pentagon doesn’t want because they are not useful for today’s national security needs. To my surprise, Obama actually prevailed  on this.

I can also name two areas where he proposed very sensible legislation that a heavy majority of economists of both parties would support, and yet where he has lost in Congress (at least so far). One is cutting agricultural subsidies to agribusiness and rich farmers. Another is auctioning off most of the greenhouse gas emission permits in any plan like the Waxman-Markey Bill, rather than giving them away to industry.  (Obama’s proposal was to use the proceeds of the auctions to reduce the marginal tax rate on low-income workers, to “Make Work Pay,” which would have been an excellent use of the funds.)

But the fact that he is trying, and that he is winning some of the battles, is important.  He is willing to fight the fight, while yet compromising when politically necessary. It is tremendously important that the public take notice of these details. There are always particular interest groups that stand to lose from any given reform such as farm supports,  military procurement or emission permit auctions; if the general public pays no attention to the details and does not support the President on them, it means special interests will triumph over the general good as so often in the past.

If I had to find one mistake that the White House has made, the initial economic forecasts were too optimistic, at least with respect to the unemployment rate. It was an honest mistake, but a mistake nonetheless… not just with respect to the economics: politically, Obama would have been better to recognize the severity of the recession from day one.

Regarding the health plan, we as yet have no idea what the outcome will be. The big questions, of course, are how to reduce costs and how to pay for getting everybody insured. Instead of proposing an income surcharge on the wealthy, I would have preferred eliminating non-taxability of employer-provided health benefits— that’s what McCain was for in the campaign, and most economists as well. The non-taxability could have been retained for workers in lower income brackets if the White House felt this was essential.  At the least, Senator Kerry’s astute version, which is aimed at curbing the effective taxpayer subsidy in the cases of the most egregiously expensive health care insurers, should be politically saleable.   You can call Obama’s failure, so far, to move in this direction a second mistake. But, since Fortune asked my opinion of how much the President has done right versus wrong, I put the score at 98 to 2. 

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Most international summit meetings are long on photo-opportunities and short on substance.   There was a great danger that last Thursday’s G-20 meeting in London would be merit comparison to the failed World Economic Conference of 1933, which was also held in London.   This one, however, did have genuine substance.   

Nobody reads the communiques, or listens to the press conferences of leaders or finance ministers. But here is the substance:

Top of the list of accomplishments was expansion of IMF resources. The new SDR allocation was perhaps the most noteworthy and unexpected decision: those observers who have proposed such a step in the current international crisis, or in past international crises, have usually been dismissed as pipe-dreamers (John Williamson, Dani Rodrik, George Soros, Joe Stiglitz…). In addition, there seems to have been some forward movement on international regulation of the financial sector, as the Europeans wanted. Although President Obama acquitted himself well overall, the failure to achieve agreement for coordinated additional fiscal stimulus, as the Americans wanted, was probably the greatest shortcoming of the meeting.

I believe the G-20 meeting will be remembered historically, but not primarily for the above reasons. It will be remembered as the occasion on which primary emphasis shifted from the G-7, the global steering group that until now has had a monopoly on real economic decision-making power, to the G-20. Of the various substantive ways in which developing countries could and should have been given more representation in recent years, the shift to the G-20 is the first one to have actually taken place.

Secretary Tim Geithner announced today the long-awaited details on the financial repair plan that he promised on February 10.   Some reactions have been negative, both from the left and the right.  Paul Krugman, for example, argues that the plan does not go far enough in forcing banks to recognize the fallen value of their assets.  

But the stock market was “dazzled“ by Geithner’s explanation of the PPIP proposal, with prices up strongly.    The  plan has no shortage of defenders.  Brad DeLong makes some good points, and responds to Krugman.   The Geithner Plan is an improvement over the Paulson plan in that when ”toxic assets,” now called “legacy assets,” are bought from the banks, their prices are set by private bidding (from hedge funds and private equity companies), rather than by an overworked Treasury official pulling a number out of the air and risking that the taxpayer grossly overpays for the assets.   On similar grounds, Nouriel Roubini has surprised the cynics by giving (qualified) support for the plan, and points out that its design appears to follow a recent proposal by my Harvard colleage Lucien Bebchuk.  

Joe Stiglitz, who attacks the Administration’s proposal, offhandedly mentions “It has allowed the administration to avoid going back to Congress” to ask for more money “and it provided a way to avoid nationalization,” as if these were not key advantages for those who have to work in the real political world.  It is true that we might end up with some form of temporary bank nationalization before we are done.  And it is also true that the lesson from Roosevelt’s strategy in 1933, from the slower response to the Saving and Loan problems in the late 1980s, and from Japan’s much more delayed response to its banking disaster of the 1990s, is that biting the bullet early saves even greater expense later.  But as Alan Blinder says, it matters which bullet you bite.  He points out some neglected counter-arguments to the nationalization strategy that is newly beloved of academic critics.  It would be hard to enforce a clear drawing of the line as to which banks would be taken over.   Furthermore — even with the necessary wiping out of bank shareholders — (i) the word “nationalization” would likely violate a political constraint, while (ii) making good on the banks’ outstanding obligations would likely violate the government’s budget constraint.

My feeling is: the Geithner plan deserves to be given a chance.  I discussed it on NPR’s On Point this morning.   Some of the callers evinced the anger that the American public understandably feels against the financial sector and the understandable pain of the recession.   I made an analogy with 9/11/01, when understandable anger and pain led the American public to support presidential policies that made things worse rather then better — the invasion of an irrelevant country, plus big tax cuts for the rich — consequences that we are still living with today.   In the current crisis,it is important that the anger be channeled in directions that will make things better rather than worse.

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     It is ironic that the dollar has strengthened rather than weakened over the last year.

· The sub-prime mortgage crisis originated in the United States;

· The crisis has severely undermined the credibility of American financial institutions – both in the narrower sense that leading investment banks have now disappeared and in the broader sense that American modes of corporate governance have lost value as role models (rating agencies, accounting systems, executive compensation, and so on)

· The response in Washington has included further acceleration in the already-rising national debt plus an expansion of the US money supply and reduction in policy interest rates that, though appropriate, are unprecedented.

Under normal conditions, any country on the receiving end of three such bullet-points would see its currency go down in flames. Yet the dollar has appreciated.

The explanation is not a mystery. The world’s investors have in two years gone from inordinately low perceptions of (and aversion to) risk and illiquidity, to inordinately higher perceptions of (and aversion to) risk and illiquidity. Virtually all assets other than US Treasury bills look risky and illiquid. That there has been a flight to quality is not surprising. What is perhaps surprising is that US Treasury bills continue to be perceived as the safest of safe havens and the US dollar continues to be the preferred international currency. The flight to the dollar shows up in both the strength of the dollar and the low level of US interest rates. For those of us who warned that the unsustainable current account deficit could eventually lead to a decline in the international role of the dollar at the hands of the euro… that day is not today.

The most noteworthy flows into the dollar and into US treasury securities have for some years been coming in the form of purchases by foreign central banks. The People’s Bank of China reached $ 2 trillion in international reserves at the end of 2008 (actually 1.95 trillion), which it continues to hold predominantly in dollars. Other central banks among Asian exporters of manufactures and Gulf exporters of oil have been behaving similarly.     China’s leaders are beginning to worry that the debt is growing too large, and President Obama recently had to reassure them about the safety of US Treasury securities.  The American public is increasingly being made aware that the United States has grown dependent on the Chinese for its funding, that our interest rates will go up if they stop buying our treasury bills.  

     There is another irony, however. Even while the US has grown increasingly dependent on holdings of dollars by the People’s Bank of China, US politicians maintain their demands that the People’s Bank of China abandon its purchases of dollars. They don’t usually phrase it this way, because the logical contradiction would be too glaring. Instead the US policy has been, and apparently still is, that China should allow its currency to appreciate. But it is elementary economics that PBoC purchases of dollars over the last six years are the force that has prevented the Renminbi from appreciating. The American insistence that the RMB appreciate is an insistence that the PBoC should stop buying dollars.   Be careful what you wish for !

(The accompanying cartoon captures the idea… except that, as Shang-Jin Wei points out, the sign should really say “Float the Yuan” instead of “Fix the Yuan.”   And in fact the danger is that the dragon will at our request stop flooding us with liquidity.)

[Source: KAL’s cartoon From The Economist print edition - Aug 9th 2007 - Illustration by Kevin Kallaugher

http://media.economist.com/images/20070811/D3207WW0.jpg]

     The authorities in Beijing have in various ways taken some steps in the direction that Americans have demanded, allowing the RMB to appreciate against the dollar. I have written in the past on the details of what exchange rate policy the Chinese have actually followed over the last four years, and I plan to update that analysis in a successor post in two days.

     My position on what policy the Chinese should follow regarding the Renminbi has been roughly in the middle of a contentious range of commentators over the last few years:

 On the one hand, I have argued:

(i) that it is foolish for American politicians to place so much emphasis on this issue in our bilateral relations

(ii) that it is dangerous to ignore the flip-side implications for funding of US deficits, and

(iii) that it is unwise to use language such as “unfair manipulation” or “violation of international rules.”

On the other hand, I have argued that an appreciation was both

(i) in the interest of China, for a number of reasons, and

(ii) in the interest of the world, to help address the global imbalances problem.

The balance of arguments has now shifted. Overheating is no longer the problem for the Chinese economy that it was as recently as a year ago, having been pushed aside by an abrupt fall in exports. Global imbalances are no longer the most important problem for the world macroeconomy, having been supplanted by the inadequacy of demand. If American politicians are still inclined to make demands on China, it would be more logical to ask for increased fiscal stimulus. Given that China often reacts adversely to foreign pressure, however, perhaps it is just as well that American politicians have been asking for the wrong thing.

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